






































Chapter 1—Oedipus: hamartia, freedom, and the supernatural 
 
1 A question of blame 
Nothing in the study of tragedy has been the subject of so much controversy as the question 
of the guilt or innocence of Sophocles’ Oedipus, who, having been told by Apollo’s oracle 
that he would murder his father and marry his mother, shunned Corinth, where he had been 
brought up by Polybus and Merope. He did this because he assumed that Polybus and Merope 
were his real parents, despite the fact that his birth had been called in question (admittedly by 
a drunkard) at a feast, that, on being asked to satisfy him on the point, his supposed parents 
had prevaricated, and that Apollo too, when asked by Oedipus who his real parents were, had 
evaded the question. Travelling from Delphi, Oedipus arrived at a crossroads where he 
encountered an older man, clearly a nobleman of some sort, riding in a carriage and 
accompanied by servants. These ordered Oedipus to get out of the way, he refused and struck 
out, they retaliated, and in the ensuing fracas Oedipus killed the lord and, as he thought, the 
entire entourage (in fact one retainer escaped). He found his way to Thebes, which was being 
terrorized by the grisly Sphinx; Oedipus solved the latter’s famous riddle, and so routed it. 
Since Thebes’ king, Laius, had recently been killed, Oedipus was offered the throne, which 
he accepted together with the hand of Laius’ widow, Jocasta. Thus the play’s background: 
during the course of Sophocles’ drama it turns out that the older man whom Oedipus killed 
was Laius, king of Thebes and his own father, and that Jocasta is his mother. When the facts 
emerge, Jocasta commits suicide, and Oedipus blinds himself. The play begins some years 
into Oedipus’ reign. As king of Thebes, he is called upon to cure the city of a strange plague: 
his attempts to ascertain its causes lead, step by agonizing step, to the discovery of his origin 
and past deeds; the play ends with Oedipus’ separation from his children, a scene which is 
‘one of the most overwhelming moments in the Western imaginative tradition, bearing 
comparison with Priam’s kissing of Achilles’ hands, or Lear’s final entry with Cordelia’s 
body in his arms, or Wotan’s Farewell’.1  
 
The question I wish to address first in this book is whether Oedipus is guilty. Is he to blame 
for his fate? This has often, especially since the onset of the early-modern period, been 
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 Buxton 1996, 45. On the problems presented by the end of the play, see Segal 1981, 208; M. Davies 
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considered to be the play’s central problem.2 An influential statement was that of André 
Dacier, who in his commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics declared that Oedipus’ transgression 
was ‘the fault of a man who, consumed by anger at the insolence of a coachman who tries to 
move him aside against his will, kills four men two days after the oracle had warned him that 
he would kill his own father’, and that he was beset by ‘pride, violence and a fit of anger, 
temerity and imprudence’ (1692, 192). In a sense, Dacier conceded, Oedipus’ punishment 
was unjust, because his acts of parricide and incest were involuntary; but though he was 
ignorant he was also foolish, reckless, and subject to passion. His vices are just those ‘of 
which Sophocles wants us to rid ourselves’.3 If Dacier imagined that he had spoken the last 
word on the question of Oedipus’ guilt he was sadly mistaken, and the matter has been 
vigorously debated ever since. Sophocles’ tragedy, according to many, is not about guilt and 
punishment; rather, it aims to be an imago humanae vitae, and in particular to insist on the 
frailty of human happiness. Such critics have often held Oedipus to be morally innocent. 
Thus, in his influential book on Aristotle’s Poetics, first published in 1894, S. H. Butcher 
construed the facts of the Oedipus story rather differently from Dacier, opining that, ‘though 
of a hasty and impulsive temperament’, Oedipus was not, ‘broadly speaking’, brought down 
by ‘any striking moral defect’, for ‘his character was not the determining factor in his 
fortunes. He, if any man, was in a genuine sense the victim of circumstances. In slaying Laius 
he was probably in some degree morally culpable. But the act was certainly done after 
provocation, and possibly in self-defence’ (1951, 320). Others have gone further than Butcher 
and affirmed Oedipus to be entirely free from blame. So in 1899, two hundred years after 
Dacier’s déclaration, the foremost classicist of the age, Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, 
spoke ein großes Machtwort: ‘Oedipus hat sich nichts vorzuwerfen’, he pronounced; 
‘Oedipus has nothing to reproach himself with’ (1935–72, vol. 6, 209). And therewith he 
certainly intended to end the dispute once and for all. 
 
But the opposition could not be so easily dismissed, and in the chapter that he contributed to 
his son Tycho’s book on Sophocles, Wilamowitz Vater stated that the verbiage about 
Oedipus’ guilt would never end, because there would always be people who den getretenen 
Quark weiter treten. ‘But they should at least admit that they thereby claim to understand 
Sophocles better than he understood himself’ (1996, 350). I shall be treading the same quark 
again here; do I claim to understand Sophocles better than he understood himself? Well, 
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 See Korzeniewski 2003, 476–505; Lurje 2004, 13–225. 
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 Dacier 1692, 193. Cf. Lurje 2004, 132–3; Billings 2014, 24–5. 
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Sophocles may or may not have understood his own play, and what we, Sophocles’ modern 
readers and spectators, are interested in is not what he, the man, thought his work meant, but 
what it did, and does, mean.
4
 But if Wilamowitz’s talk of how Sophocles understood his play 
is just a roundabout way of referring to the meaning of the work (as such talk often is), then 
clearly someone who treads the same quark again is not going simultaneously to concede that 
he or she misunderstands that work. Whichever way you cut the cake, then (if that is what the 
quark is for), Wilamowitz’s remark misfires. Still, many recent commentators could have 
wished that he had laid the whole matter of Oedipus’ guilt to rest. As E. R. Dodds discovered 
at Oxford in the early 1960s, undergraduate heads were simply chock-full of heresy. 
Whereupon Dodds spoke ein kleines Machtwort for the edification of the young and 
impressionable, in his article ‘On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex’, hoping therewith to 
consign such views as Dacier’s to the archive for good. Dodds’s essay is often regarded as a 
classic,
5
 and as having put the whole issue beyond dispute.
 
But, alas, it was again not to be: 
Dacier’s approach lives on, and it has even been revived in recent years in Wilamowitz’s own 
land by such able commentators as Eckard Lefèvre and Arbogast Schmitt.  
 
‘The plays of Sophocles, it is often supposed, exalt heroic individuals who surmount the 
worst that can be put upon them by gods indifferent or cruel’, remarks Robert Parker, 
continuing: ‘But there is much to be said for a more Aristotelo-Bradleian view, whereby 
Sophocles’ world is one marred, above all, by the disastrous flaws endemic in human 
personality’ (1999, 23). Against this stands a pervasive modern view that the ‘tradition of 
humanistic, secularized, and psychological readings’,6 championed by Bradley and in some 
sense also by Aristotle, is in error. I shall be defending the ‘Aristotelo-Bradleian view’, here 
in connection with the Oedipus Rex, and in the next chapter with the Antigone. Further, I 
shall suggest in this Part that the view applies quite generally to the protagonists of Western 
tragedy. In brief: typically, tragic protagonists fall through their own fault. I start my defence 
of the ‘Aristotelo-Bradleian view’ with Aristotle; we shall come to Bradley in due course. 
 
2 Aristotle and the concept of hamartia 
In chapter 13 of the Poetics Aristotle argued that the best form of tragedy concerns a hero or 
heroine who is neither morally outstanding nor morally base, but somewhere in between, or is 
                                                 
4
 See Gaskin 2013a, ch. 7. 
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 Bain 1993, 81; J. Gould 2001, 244. 
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 Ewans 1996, 450. 
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rather better than worse, but who falls, in such a way as to elicit the emotions of pity and fear 
in the audience, because of some significant (megalē) hamartia.7 The translation of this last 
word has vexed commentators and critics endlessly. Dodds remarks that the concept of 
hamartia covers both false moral judgement and intellectual error, and that ‘the average 
Greek did not make our sharp distinction between the two’.8 (In English the use of the term 
‘ignorant’ in a social or moral sense is still found in some places, or was until recently.)9 
Dodds might have gone further, and pointed out that the distinction itself is suspect. In his 
article ‘Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy’, still the most important discussion of 
hamartia to date, T. C. W. Stinton argued persuasively that the word ‘hamartia’ has a wide 
range of meanings, including ones that by any reckoning count as moral. For example, 
Aristotle characterizes the ignorance of the wicked man (mochthēros) of what he should do 
and what omit to do as a hamartia.
10
 Again, in Euripides’ Iphigeneia at Aulis, Clytemnestra 
describes Helen, whom she has every reason to regard as a serious transgressor, as ‘mistaken’ 
(examartousa, 1204), which shows how strong, in a moral sense, this word can be.
11
 Perhaps 
even more strikingly, Orestes accuses Apollo in the Orestes of hamartia (596), a bold move 
in Euripides’ best blasphemous style, clearly evincing a moral sense. Stinton was anticipated 
by Gilbert Murray, who is in his preface to Bywater’s translation of the Poetics remarked, 
concerning Aristotle’s concept of hamartia, that ‘it is a mistake of method to argue whether 
he means “an intellectual error” or “a moral flaw”. The word is not so precise’.12 ‘Flaw’ here 
is wrongly selected, both given the contrast Murray wanted to draw and in the light of general 
considerations, as we shall see shortly: he should have written ‘a moral error’. But modulo 
that adjustment his point stands. Despite these precedents, we still regularly encounter 
simplistic statements such as the following: ‘For Aristotle (Chapter 13), Oedipus is an 
                                                 
7
 On the legitimacy of the terms ‘hero’ and ‘heroine’, see D. Lucas 1972, 115, 140, and Vickers 1973, 
7–8, against Jones 1962, 12–18 (duBois 2008 supports Jones); also Halliwell 1990b, 173–4; Gill 
1996, 98–9; Silk 2004, 246–7; Rose 2012, 257. 
8
 Dodds 1973, 66. This is esp. clear in Euripides: see e.g. Cyclops 173; Children of Heracles 458; 
Hippolytus 377–81, 996; Andromache 674, 1165; Hecuba 327; Electra 50–3, 294–6, 386–90, 971–2, 
1035; Heracles 172, 283, 347, 1254; Iphigeneia in Tauris 385–6; Ion 374; Helen 851, 1441; 
Phoenician Women 86, 393, 569–70, 584, 1726–7; Orestes 417, 492–3; also [Aeschylus], Prometheus 
Vinctus 9 and 1039; with the commentaries of Seaford, Allan, Barrett, Stevens, J. Gregory, Denniston, 
Cropp, Bond, L. Parker, Lee, Mastronarde, Willink, and Griffith ad locc. Cf. Denniston 1939, xxii; 
Butcher 1951, 321; Dodds 1951, 16–17; D. Lucas 1972, 301; Winnington-Ingram 1980, 122; Dihle 
1982, 33–4; Dover 1994, 116–24; Mastronarde 2010, 190; Rutherford 2012, 379. 
9
 Bond mentions Ulster in this connection (on Euripides, Heracles 283); I recall the usage from my 
childhood in the North-East of Scotland; Malcolm Heath tells me that he encountered it in Yorkshire. 
10
 Nicomachean Ethics (NE) 1110b29. Cf. D. Lucas 1972, 300. 
11
 Cf. Euripides, Trojan Women 1028; Ion 426; Alcestis 709–10, with L. Parker ad loc. 
12
 Bywater 1920, 11. 
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exemplary tragic figure whose fall is consequent on an intellectual error (hamartia) rather 
than any morally dubious action’.13 What Stinton showed is that the ‘rather than’ here is 
misconceived. 
 
Stinton notes that it would be fallacious to argue that contexts in which the word ‘hamartia’ 
is applied to a failure to hit the target, or similar, are non-moral ones if the failure in question 
is one that we would classify as moral.
14
 But he does not question the widespread modern 
assumption that there is a fundamental division between moral and intellectual error: he does 
not allow the Greek policy of using one word to cover both of these cases to suggest to us 
that perhaps our neat distinction between the two is facile. This emerges from his insistence 
that Oedipus’ error was of a factual, not of a moral, nature; what goes missing here is the 
thought that it might be both—that a given factual error could be a moral error, and, more 
generally, that moral error might be a species of factual error (morality being a domain of 
fact); correspondingly, that moral intelligence and moral stupidity might be genuine cognitive 
categories. Again, Stinton draws up a list of what he takes to be the range of hamartiai that 
we can presume Aristotle would have wished to allow as constituting good subject matter for 
tragedy. The list comprises (i) some involuntary acts (akousia), namely acts done through 
ignorance, that is, mistake of fact, unless the consequences are wholly unforeseeable; and (ii) 
voluntary acts (hekousia), including so-called mixed actions (see §5 below), acts done in 
ignorance due to passion, acts of injustice (adikēmata) committed without deliberation 
because of the onset of a passion, and acts that arise from akrasia, weakness of will (1990, 
157–8). Stinton remarks that all these involve extenuating circumstances. He does not suggest 
that they all have a moral dimension, but they do. Even the involuntary acts that he lists have 
a moral status, since here wholly unforeseeable consequences are expressly excluded: the 
agent could and perhaps should have foreseen the consequences, but did not. 
 
Dodds observes that ‘Since Poetics 13 is in general concerned with the moral character of the 
tragic hero, many scholars have thought in the past (and many undergraduates still think) that 
the hamartia of Oedipus must in Aristotle’s view be a moral fault’ (1973, 66). Dodds himself 
rejects the view that Aristotle held any hamartia—and so Oedipus’ hamartia—to be 
necessarily in some way moral;
15
 but I believe that this traditional interpretation of Aristotle 
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 Macintosh 2009, 1–2. 
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 Stinton 1990, 145–6. Cf. Adkins 1966, 82; Cessi 1987, 15–28, 37; Schmitt 1988a, 184. 
15
 Cf. D. Lucas 1972, 144–6; Halliwell 2005, 404; Conte 2007, 158; Greiner 2012, 16, 47–51, 124–6. 
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is correct. That is secured, I suggest, by the fact, already noted, that the tragic hero is there 
represented as being intermediate between the wholly virtuous agent, the epieikēs, who by 
implication is morally outstanding (not the usual sense of this word, but the context seems to 
constrain it here),
16
 and the wicked or base person, the mochthēros or ponēros or kakos. Since 
the extremes are moral qualities, it follows that the intermediate position must also be moral 
in nature; and indeed that the tragic hero is morally intermediate is explicitly stated by 
Aristotle. Now it is true, as some critics have observed,
17
 that Aristotle does not explicitly say 
that the hero’s hamartia has to do with his morally intermediate status: one might insist that 
Aristotle’s wording was compatible with the hero’s being of a morally intermediate status 
anyway, which would leave the door open to the possibility that the hamartia was non-moral, 
and unconnected with the hero’s moral character.18 But that would be a disappointingly 
uneconomical upshot. One would expect the hero’s morally intermediate status and his 
hamartia to be significantly related. In fact one would expect Aristotle to think that the hero 
enjoyed a morally intermediate status in virtue of his hamartia, or rather in virtue of 
possessing a character issuing in, and exemplified by, that hamartia. The philosophically taut 
position would be that the hamartia in question measures the moral distance between the 
hero’s morally intermediate status and the moral status of a fully virtuous person.19 Economy 
of thought demands that the hamartia be, for Aristotle, the reason why—or at least 
organically connected with the reason(s) why—the hero does not count as morally 
outstanding. If this is right, it follows that, for Aristotle, the hamartia committed by a tragic 
hero, and by virtue of which he falls below the high standards of the epieikēs, is a specifically 
moral mistake. (This also fits with Aristotle’s use of ‘hamartia’ and cognates in his 
discussion of the virtues in Nicomachean Ethics II–V, where ‘hamartia’ is regularly used of 
missing the mean and tending to excess or deficiency, so that it is clearly moral in content.) 
 
The fall of a morally flawless agent would, Aristotle informs us, occasion outrage (Poetics 
1452b36). Why? The obvious reason is that there would, in accounting for the fall of a 
morally flawless agent, be a deficit of rationalization and justification.
20
 In accordance with 
the principle that the events of the tragic plot should, given the initial parameters, unfold 
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 See on this point D. Lucas 1972, 140; Stinton 1990, 164; M. Nussbaum 1992, 150–4; Heath 2017, 
337–9. 
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 See von Fritz 1962, 3–4; Lurje 2004, 335 n. 52.  
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 Cf. D. Lucas 1972, 141–4. 
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 Harsh 1945, 56–7; F. Lucas 1957, 117 n. 1; Cessi 1987, 29–30; Lefèvre 2001, 7; Schmitt 2011, 438; 
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 Cf. Lear 1992, 329. 
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according to probability and necessity (Poetics 9),
21
 Aristotle’s view, one surmises, is that no 
such perspicuous and comprehensible causal sequence would be exemplified by a wholly 
good man struck down by simple ill-luck (by an atuchēma).22 We must be able to account for 
the hero’s fall in terms of his actions, and these actions in turn must be grounded in the 
agent’s moral character: only so will the tragic plot unfold in an explanatorily satisfying way. 
So the hamartia must arise explicably from the agent’s character. This is a version of the 
point about economy. Here we should note that Aristotle is primarily concerned with tragic 
agency. Martha Nussbaum objects to the supposition that ‘hero-causality’ and 
‘unintelligibility’ are ‘exhaustive options’: ‘They are not. There is no mystery about what 
happens to the Trojan women. War, rape, slavery, murder are all too easy to understand. But 
what mistake did they make, innocent or otherwise, to bring all this about?’ (1992, 141). I 
shall examine the case of the Trojan women in Chapter 3: here I simply note that one of my 
conclusions there will be that, to the extent that tragedy portrays suffering as undeserved, it 
also diminishes the agency of the sufferers. (Nussbaum seems to concede this point: 1992, 
156.) So I think Aristotle’s view is best cast in terms of agency: to the extent that disaster 
befalls a tragic agent, it is from an explanatory perspective most economical and satisfying if 
that agent’s suffering is organically connected to mistakes that flow from his character. (I 
shall say more about this formulation shortly.) And, as far as the point about outrage goes, we 
might add the following: it would scarcely be less outrageous for a tragic agent who, as 
Aristotle insists (1453a16–17), though morally intermediate is rather better than worse, to be 
punished for a mistake that was not organically related to his moral character, than for a 
morally perfect protagonist to be punished for such a mistake.
23
 That supplies additional 
support to the view that the tragic hero’s hamartia serves to measure the moral distance 
between his morally intermediate status and a fully virtuous person’s moral status. 
 
A further, quasi-linguistic argument for the moral nature of the hero’s hamartia was given by 
Butcher in a famous passage where he wrote that the word ‘hamartia’ is brought by Aristotle 
in Poetics 13 ‘into relation with other words of purely moral significance, words moreover 
which describe not an isolated act, but a more permanent state’ (1951, 319). Butcher’s point 
is that, since Aristotle says that the tragic hero is neither outstanding in virtue (aretē) and 
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 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1090b19; J. Armstrong 1998.  
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 Harsh 1945, 49; F. Lucas 1957, 122–3; T. Gould 1966, 514–15; Cessi 1987, 265; Schmitt 2011, 
437; Greiner 2012, 65. 
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 Cf. Alexander 1955, 84–5; Halliwell 2006, 135–6. 
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justice (dikaiosunē) nor marked by wickedness (kakia and mochthēria), but falls because of a 
significant hamartia, we would expect this last word to denote, like the other key terms in its 
vicinity, a relatively fixed, morally assessable state of character. Now I have agreed that the 
context shows that Aristotle did conceive his hero’s hamartia in moral terms. However, we 
must exercise care over Butcher’s other inference—that ‘hamartia’ denotes a state. In the 
same place Butcher influentially offered ‘flaw of character’24 as a gloss on Aristotelian 
hamartia, adding that the flaw should not be ‘tainted by a vicious purpose’. But, as a matter 
of terminological book-keeping, we should insist that a hamartia is not as such a character 
trait; it is a mistaken action, or a mistaken belief that gives rise to a mistaken action.
25
 So the 
word ‘hamartia’ does not mean ‘flaw of character’. If, for example, the hamartia of Virgil’s 
Dido was her betrayal of Sychaeus, it would be a category error to suppose that this was her 
tragic flaw, because betrayal is an act, not a state.
26
 Nevertheless, the underlying point that 
those persuaded by Butcher’s translation have often had in their sights is, I suggest, correct: 
namely that tragic heroes who commit hamartiai do so because they have flawed 
characters.
27
 Dacier may have thought that Oedipus was punished for his character, but that 
cannot be right just as it stands: as we shall see in due course, he is punished for his deeds. 
Still, his deeds arose in a comprehensible way from his character: in a play constructed 
according to Aristotelian principles of probability and necessity, that is just what we should 
expect,
28
 and as we shall see it is what, time after time, the tragic tradition offers us. 
Moreover, for an Aristotelian, an agent is at least partially responsible for his character.
29
 The 
essential point was seen by Lessing, who in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn emphasized that 
the hero’s misfortune must be grounded, via a hamartia, in his character.30 And it takes us to 
Bradley, for two of the key doctrines of Shakespearean Tragedy are that ‘The centre of 
tragedy . . . may be said with equal truth to lie in action issuing from character, or in character 
issuing in action’, and that ‘action is essentially the expression of character’ (1991, 29, 35). 
 
So the facts that hamartia is moral and that it is grounded in character are intimately 
connected in Aristotle’s thinking. They are connected via the idea of the tragic agent’s 
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 This translation was adopted by e.g. Kitto 1960, 233, and T. Gould 1965, 366. 
25
 Barnwell 1982, 243; cf. D. Lucas 1972, 300; Dewar-Watson 2014, 54. For a case where ‘hamartia’ 
means a mistaken belief, see Aristotle, NE 1110b29. 
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 See here Rudd 1976, 34–5. 
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 Cf. Ahrensdorf 2009, 169. 
28
 See Poetics 15, esp. 1454a33–6. 
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 NE III, 5; Schmitt 1988a, 162–3; Everson 1990, 93–7. 
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morally intermediate status: the hamartia arises from that status, which makes it both moral 
and grounded in the agent’s character. As far as the latter point is concerned, there are two 
opposite errors here that we need to avoid. On the one hand, there is the view encapsulated in 
the translation ‘flaw’, namely that hamartia just is character.31 Against this, we should insist 
that character (ēthos) and tragic error (hamartia) are categorially distinct: character is a 
standing disposition (or set of dispositions); an error is an action. On the Aristotelo-Bradleian 
view, the tragic error, which is an action, flows from the relevant agent’s character.32 At the 
opposite extreme, the view that ēthos and hamartia have nothing to do with one another, and 
that a hamartia is a lapse committed by someone who is of generally good ēthos,33 forfeits 
any link between character and action. In between these two unattractive extremes, we have 
(appropriately enough) the Aristotelian and the Bradleian and, I suggest, the correct view that 
hamartia and ēthos are indeed ontologically distinct, but that the former arises from the latter 
in a fully causal and comprehensible way. Christopher Gill argues (1986, 262) that in 
Sophocles’ Ajax the moral character of Ajax is not a datum, but is itself the central problem 
of the play, and that this reading of it is non-Aristotelian. But there is no difficulty for 
Aristotle: if we accept Gill’s interpretation of the play (as I think we should), an Aristotelian 
can say that the problematic nature of Ajax’ hamartia leads back to the problematic status of 
his character, precisely because the hamartia arises naturally from his character. Peter 
Lamarque argues (2004, 275) that we should not think of hamartia as a ‘fatal flaw’ in 
character ‘in a purely negative sense, for then the character would be somewhat less 
deserving of our sympathy. Rather, as Aristotle conceives it, hamartia is best thought of as a 
contingent by-product of otherwise admirable character traits—for example, the tendency of 
the courageous soldier to take especially unwise risks’. But the tendency of a soldier to take 
especially unwise risks is rashness, and in Aristotelian terms that is a flaw ‘in a purely 
negative sense’.34 Lamarque is right that, for Aristotle, tragic heroes must be admirable; but 
they must also, in his view, be flawed. Tragic economy would favour a connection between 
their flaws and what makes heroes admirable—and indeed a necessary connection, not mere 
contingency, as Lamarque suggests. That is just what we find in the tradition. For example, 
the tragedy of Euripides’ Hippolytus consists, as W. S. Barrett remarks, ‘in the fact that his 
downfall springs from a defect that is the reverse side of his very virtue: his cult of purity, for 
                                                 
31
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 See e.g. Aristotle, NE 1127a27–8, 1127b2–3, 14–15; Bradley 1991, 29–30. 
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all its beauty and nobility, is bound up with an intolerant rejection of an essential part of 
human life’ (1964, 391).  
 
The relevant defects of character in tragic protagonists do not, as such, make them wicked. It 
is worth stressing this point, since one sometimes meets the contrary assertion. For example, 
Richard Waswo argues that Aristotle’s doctrine of hamartia does not apply to Marlowe’s 
Faustus or Shakespeare’s Macbeth on the basis that ‘If we regard the choice as guilty, then 
the terrible suffering which Faustus and Macbeth subsequently undergo is [sc. on Aristotle’s 
view] merely the just punishment of bad men, which is not tragic’ (1974, 64). But a choice 
can be wrong, even deeply wrong, without rendering the chooser wicked. It would be an 
opposite mistake to shy away from the full implications of the judgement that the tragic agent 
does indeed go wrong morally. Critics sometimes worry that, if we say this, we cast ourselves 
in a morally superior role, wagging a homiletic finger at the hero or heroine. But a judgement 
can be moralizing without being moralistic, in the pejorative sense of this latter word. The 
moralizing stance is inevitable: if I judge that you have made a moral mistake, I necessarily 
censure your action; to that extent I do take up a morally superior stance. It does not follow 
that I have to adopt a sanctimonious attitude towards you and your error, and indeed 
Aristotle’s stress on the similarity to us of the tragic protagonist, and on the audience’s 
feelings of fear and pity, precludes this. There is no inconsistency between the audience’s 
censuring the tragic agent’s conduct, and feeling sympathy for him or her: on Aristotle’s view 
the spectator can, and does, do both.
35
 (I shall return to these points in §5.) 
 
I have argued that Aristotle intended his use of ‘hamartia’ in Poetics 13 to be taken in a 
moralizing sense, against interpreters who deny that a hamartia is a moral mistake. Brian 
Vickers, following Gerald Else, holds that ‘hamartia’ can only mean ‘ignorance of the 
identity of a blood relative’ (1973, 61). (Vickers is influenced by Aristotle’s examples, to 
which I shall come in due course.) Dodds gives a slightly less restrictive account of hamartia, 
writing that ‘it is almost certain that Aristotle was using “hamartia” here [in Poetics 13] as he 
uses “hamartēma” in the Nicomachean Ethics (1135b12) and in the Rhetoric (1374b6), to 
mean an offence committed in ignorance of some material fact and therefore free from 
ponēria or kakia’.36 Unfortunately, Dodds’s cross-reference is inexact. If we look at what 
Aristotle actually says in the first of the passages that we are referred to, NE V, 8, we find a 
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threefold distinction among kinds of harm (blabai) between atuchēmata, hamartēmata, and 
adikēmata, this last species being further divided into two subspecies (1135b11–25).37 When 
the harm is accompanied by the ignorance of the agent, and could not have been foreseen, 
Aristotle tells us that it is a stroke of bad luck, an atuchēma; at the other extreme, we have 
acts of injustice, adikēmata, performed by unjust and wicked agents, adikoi and ponēroi. 
Aristotle distinguishes two intermediate cases: on the one hand there are mistakes, 
hamartēmata, which are like atuchēmata except that they could have been foreseen; on the 
other hand there are acts of injustice, adikēmata, which are unlike extreme such acts, in that 
the agent did the critical deed without wickedness. In this latter case the agent knows what he 
is doing, but he does not do what he does as a result of prior deliberation; he is therefore not 
wicked. He acts, Aristotle informs us, as a consequence of anger or another passion. Agents 
who slip up in this way, we are told, are hamartanontes (that is, they commit a hamartia); in 




Of these four types of harm, the two intermediate cases are clearly both relevant to Poetics 
13, whereas adikēmata performed by wicked agents are ruled out as candidates for tragic 
hamartiai, as are atuchēmata, which do not occur by probability or necessity.39 Examination 
of NE V, 8 reveals that not only what Aristotle expressly calls ‘hamartēmata’, but also 
adikēmata that are performed without deliberation or wickedness, and in respect of which, as 
we have just noted, Aristotle also uses the language of hamartia, correspond to the 
‘hamartia’ of Poetics 13.40 Such adikēmata are moral transgressions; but it is also true, as I 
have observed, that what Aristotle calls ‘hamartēmata’ at NE 1135b18—that is, those blabai 
that are like atuchēmata except that they could have been foreseen—are moral failings, 
precisely because, though the relevant consequences were not foreseen, they could—and, it is 
implied, should—have been foreseen.41 So while Dodds is right that a hamartia is free from 
kakia, he is wrong to hold that this is because it is non-moral, limited to mere ‘ignorance of 
some material fact’.42 It is also misleading to say that in NE V, 8 ‘hamartia and hamartēma 
are sharply distinguished from flaw or defect of character’.43 They are distinguished in the 
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sense that they are not as such flaws or defects of character; their ontological category is that 
of, broadly speaking, events. But they do, as we have seen, arise from such character traits. 
Again, when Artemis at the end of Euripides’ Hippolytus (1334–5) tells the grief-stricken and 
repentant Theseus that ‘ignorance acquits your hamartia of wickedness (kakē)’, Barrett’s 
comment on ‘hamartia’ (ad loc.), that ‘the word marks the action [of bringing about 
Hippolytus’ death] as wrong without either condemning it or excusing it’, is hardly coherent.  
Artemis allows that Theseus’ ignorance excuses him of wickedness, that is, of committing 
Aristotle’s extreme type of adikēma. But, overcome by passion, Theseus did commit 
Aristotle’s milder form of adikēma; that was a hamartia, and as such it does attract censure. It 
is time to return to Oedipus. Stinton, like Dodds, thinks that Oedipus’ hamartia was not of a 
moral nature, and that this shows that ‘hamartia’ in Poetics 13 cannot be exclusively moral in 
sense;
44
 but I shall now reject the premiss of this argument.  
 
3 Oedipus and cognitive failure 
Dodds’s view, in agreement with Stinton, as we have just seen, is that, although he killed his 
father and married his mother, Oedipus is morally innocent. Many other commentators 
concur: Thomas Gould, opining that Aristotle’s doctrine of hamartia was ‘probably the worst 
blunder in the history of literary criticism’, asserts that ‘of all the plays that we have, ancient 
or modern, none is so specific and eloquent about the complete absence of any connection at 
all between the character of the protagonist and the consequences of his acts’; for William 
Empson, Sophocles’ play is ‘only a bad-luck story’; for John Gould the play ‘has nothing to 
say about responsibility’; for Uta Korzeniewski Oedipus’ fate is ‘eine schreiende 
Ungerechtigkeit’; and so on.45 Dodds indeed concedes that Sophocles’ hero has faults, which 
are given ample airing during the stage action: he is ‘proud and over-confident; he harbours 
unjustified suspicions against Teiresias and Creon’, and he expresses scepticism about oracles 
(1973, 66). But these faults—we shall have to fill out Dodds’s rather meagre inventory—are, 
in his view, irrelevant to the tragedy: ‘Years before the action of the play begins, Oedipus 
was already an incestuous parricide; if that was a punishment for his unkind treatment of 
Creon, then the punishment preceded the crime—which is surely an odd kind of justice’ 
(ibid.). I shall suggest (in Chapter 3) that ‘oddities’ of this kind may indeed be found in 
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tragedy, but as far as the Oedipus Rex is concerned, let us assume with Dodds that the murder 
of Laius and marrying of Jocasta were not punishments for Oedipus’ misconduct during the 
action of the play: these earlier offences (I shall come to their exact nature in due course) are 
punished in the denouement of the drama, but they are not to be regarded as being themselves 
punishments—not unless one agrees with Hugh Lloyd-Jones that, despite appearances, 
Sophocles intends the ancestral curse on the house of the Labdacids to be functional in the 
play.
46
 But, though the curse might be held to be important in Aeschylus’ Seven Against 
Thebes (and perhaps in the Oresteia),
47
 as well as in Euripides’ Phoenician Women and 





What, then, is the moral connection between the parricide and incest, on the one hand, and 
the bad behaviour on stage, on the other? There appear to be two main possibilities: (i) the 
bad behaviour justifies his punishment at the end of the play; (ii) the bad behaviour shows the 
sort of person Oedipus is, and so was at the time of the acts of killing his father and marrying 
his mother. According to (ii), the bad behaviour explains how Oedipus could have been, and 
in fact was, responsible for those acts, and is therefore culpable. Some older moralizers might 
have been happy with (i), which involves the concept of poetic justice; but modern moralizers 
are careful to limit their position to (ii); they insist that, as I have said, Oedipus is punished 
for his deeds (of parricide and incest), but also that those deeds flow from his character, and 
that the stage action shows how Oedipus has the kind of character that plausibly would issue 
in ill-considered deeds.
49
 Now the acts of parricide and incest occur, as Schiller complained 
to Goethe,
50
 and as Aristotle had already pointed out, ‘outside the drama on stage’ (Poetics 
1453b31–2), in the ‘long time’ of the play.51 But that, as Aristotle notes, is true of crucial acts 
in other tragedies too: indeed we find it exemplified throughout the tradition, by for instance 
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Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Garnier’s Hippolyte, Milton’s Samson Agonistes, Bellini’s Norma, 
and Büchner’s Dantons Tod.52 So prudent traditionalists will insist that it is no objection to 




Now Oedipus is in some respects a good man; at any rate he is not a wicked man in the 
Aristotelian sense. But he has faults, which emerge during the action of the play, and these 
are highly relevant to his earlier deeds of parricide and incest. Dodds, as we have seen, 
mentions his overconfidence,
54
 and his unjustified suspicions of Teiresias and Creon. These 
failings are both connected with his fabled swiftness of thought and action.
55
 We first meet 
this characteristic as an apparently positive endowment: when the priest in the opening scene 
hesitantly recommends consulting an oracle to ascertain the cause of the plague, it turns out 
that Oedipus has already acted (69); by the time the chorus proposes summoning Teiresias, 
Oedipus has already done so (287).
56
 But as the play develops, we realize that this speed of 
reaction has another and less satisfactory side to it, namely a tendency to react too swiftly and 
without proper reflection:
57
 as the chorus puts it, ‘the quick in counsel are not sure’ (617, tr. 
Jebb). We see this aspect of Oedipus’ character operating in the interviews with Teiresias and 
Creon—for he ignores the fact that hitherto Creon has been a trustworthy friend (385) and 
Teiresias a good seer (300–1)58—and in the accusation of arrogance that he directs at Jocasta, 
when she has discerned the truth.
59
 But the key failing that is responsible for Oedipus’ 
tragedy lies in what his precipitate behaviour signals, namely cognitive deficiency—the 
burden carried, I suggest, by the great majority of tragic heroes and heroines in the Western 
tradition. Moreover, Oedipus’ intellectual deficits are not the reverse side of an intellectual 
strength, because, contrary to what numerous commentators have asserted, he does not have 
any such strength. 
 
Dodds does not mention Oedipus’ cognitive defects, because like so many others—both 
characters in the play and readers and spectators of it—he is dazzled by Oedipus’ reputation 
for intellectual prowess. Thus Maurice Bowra talks of Oedipus as ‘a man of powerful 
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intelligence’, having ‘the gift of reaching rapidly the answer to a problem, of asking pertinent 
questions’; he has ‘vigorous mental equipment’, is ‘keen-witted and live-minded’; Bernard 
Knox tells us that Oedipus ‘has a brilliant intellect’; Brian Vickers that he is a ‘supremely 
active and intelligent man’; R. P. Winnington-Ingram that he is ‘the most intelligent of men’; 
Charles Segal that he has ‘extraordinary intelligence’ and is ‘an expert at decoding difficult 
messages’; Simon Goldhill that he is ‘a man of domineering intelligence and powerful 
scrutinizing mind’; Hans-Dieter Gelfert that Oedipus goes about his investigation ‘like a 
sharp-witted detective’; R. D. Dawe that he is ‘the most far-sighted of men . . . with a brilliant 
incisive intellect’; Vayos Liapis that he is ‘one of the finest specimens of human 
intelligence’; Peter Holbrook that he is ‘an intellectual prodigy’ with a ‘preternatural 
intelligence’.60 Similarly, many commentators have thought that the play presents Oedipus as 
someone dedicated to finding the truth,
61
 and have expatiated on his ‘epistemophiliac passion 
to lay bare his own origins’, as Terry Eagleton nicely puts it (2003, 233). Jean-Joseph Goux 
even thinks that Oedipus ‘inaugurait la conscience philosophique’ (1990, 140). The list of 





These accolades demonstrate how easy it is for critics to find what they want or expect to 
find, regardless of the evidence before them. In reality Sophocles’ drama shows Oedipus 
unintelligently avoiding the truth, which is right under his nose, for as long as possible; it 
shows him to be fixated on the near in time and place, to lack the imagination and ability to 
entertain different and alternative possibilities, to weigh and compare probabilities, and to 
marshal correctly the information that he has at his disposal.
63
 Bowra concedes, as most 
critics do and as anyone indeed must, that ‘despite his acute intelligence [Oedipus] is unable 
to see the truth until it is forced upon him’ (1945, 191), but it does not occur to him or to like-
minded critics that Oedipus’ tardiness on the uptake could imply that the characterization of 
his intellect as ‘acute’ might be in need of revision. Again, if you start from the assumption 
that Oedipus has a ‘brilliant incisive intellect’, as Dawe does, then you will inevitably find 
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the Teiresias scene dramatically unsatisfactory: ‘the apparent failure of the highly intelligent 
Oedipus to grasp what has been said to him is unconvincing; and the structure of the plot 
suffers from premature disclosure’ (2006, 9). But Dawe does not ask himself what the 
dramatic point of the ‘premature disclosure’ might be, or whether the fact that he finds the 
Teiresias scene unconvincing might be a function of his initial assumption that Oedipus is 
highly intelligent rather than an indication of Sophocles’ poor draughtsmanship. He puzzles 
over the fact that ‘a man whose intuitive brilliance had solved the riddle of the Sphinx’ (to 
which I shall come in §4) is unable to put together the pieces of information before him in the 
obvious, and correct, way—pieces of information which ‘should have led even the least 
gifted intelligence to the right conclusion’ (ibid., 16). But it does not strike him that it might 
be worth re-examining his initial assumption that Oedipus is a man of ‘intuitive brilliance’. 
We find a similar effect in some versions of the Faust story, such as Marlowe’s, whose 
Faustus is cried up, by him and his students, as a cerebral prodigy, though what we actually 
see on stage, in his dialogues with Mephostophilis, is intellectual folly and a rash willingness 




Oedipus’ cognitive failure emerges most impressively from Sophocles’ drama in the way we 
find an almost exact match between the information that the hero receives, quite early on in 
the story, about the circumstances of Laius’ death, and what he already knows about his own 
past: yet he fails to make the not-very-demanding mental leap and put the pieces together in 
the obvious way until near the end of the play.
65
 Lefèvre sets out some of the 
correspondences:
66
 Jocasta tells Oedipus that Laius received an oracle that he would be killed 
by his son (711–14); Oedipus already knows that he received an oracle that he would kill his 
father (793). She tells him that Laius was killed at a crossroads (715–16); he already knows 
that he killed an older man at a crossroads (800–13). She tells him that Laius’ son had his 
ankles fastened together (718); Oedipus knows that just this fate befell him (1032–3). To 
Lefèvre’s list we can add that Oedipus hears from Creon and Jocasta that Laius was 
accompanied by a retinue, all of whom were killed except for one man who escaped and 
reported the incident in Thebes (106–19, 750–6); Oedipus already knows that in the fracas 
with the elder in the carriage whom he killed, he also slew several others—all the others, as 
he thought (800–13). Now one does not have to have read Aristotle on reciprocal relations to 
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put these pieces of information together in the obvious way. But instead of doing that, 
Oedipus grasps at straws and fantasizes about possible escape routes: he does not, it is true, 
make anything of the discrepancy between his own recollection of having killed all his 
opponents in the crossroads incident, and the fact that one man survived from the Laius 
incident,
67
 but he does dwell on the discrepancy between the survivor’s report of robbers, in 
the plural, and his own singular identity. Further, as Voltaire observed,
68
 Teiresias accuses 
Oedipus in precisely the terms of the Delphic oracle that Oedipus had received (457–60, 791–
3). Why did Sophocles show his hand so early in the play—why did he engage in what, as we 
have seen, Dawe censures as ‘premature disclosure’—if not to cast an unflattering light on 
his hero’s intelligence? That is the point of the Teiresias episode: seeing blind man meets 
blind seeing man.
69
 When Oedipus hears from Creon that one of Laius’ retinue survived the 
incident in which Laius himself died, why does he not send for the survivor?
70
 Why has he 
not investigated the circumstances of Laius’ murder?71 Why, when he comes to understand 
that he slew Laius and married his wife, does Oedipus extract from these facts no more than 
the thought that he slew the Theban king and married that man’s wife (813–22)?72 For 
although all the bits of the puzzle are on the table, and fit together in an obvious way, 
Oedipus still thinks that Polybus and Merope are his parents. 
 
In line with what was said in the last section, we should insist that the canny traditionalist 
critic will not leap to the conclusion that Oedipus is being punished for the cognitive 
deficiencies that he displays on stage, but rather that we are supposed to infer that he evinced 
those deficiencies at a crucial earlier point—namely at the time when he killed his father and 
married his mother. Just so, in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, the hero is not punished for treading 
on the tapestries but for earlier acts in the ‘long time’ of the play, and which emanated from 
the same hubristic mentality as Agamemnon shows in the ‘carpet scene’.73 Now Sophocles’ 
Oedipus tells us himself that he killed the elder at the crossroads in an access of passion,
74
 
and it is clear from the description of the act of homicide that, as I shall argue below (§5), his 
response to the provocation he thought he had received was not an act of reasonable self-
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defence on his part, but an irrational and culpable overreaction to what had in fact been 
normal behaviour on the part of his victims. As a student of mine put it: ‘he killed his dad in a 
fit of road rage’.75 But more important than this point is the fact that Oedipus had the 
insouciance to get himself into the position, in the first place, of killing a man old enough to 
be his father and marrying a woman old enough to be his mother, not long after he had 
received Apollo’s prediction;76 by contrast, in Grillparzer’s Die Ahnfrau, Jaromir, who kills 
his own father, is given no such forewarning. (The twin facts that Laius was old enough to be 
Oedipus’ father and Jocasta old enough to be his mother are not given any emphasis by 
Sophocles, but that is because he they would be familiar to the audience as elements of the 
myth.)
77
 Oedipus’ outbursts of passion during the stage action, his tendency to react too 
precipitately, his short-sightedness, his failure to exercise his supposed intelligence—these 
things are there in the play to apprize us of the fact that they have always been there as 
features of Oedipus’ character, and were responsible for the acts of parricide and incest in the 
‘long time’ of the drama.78 Those who assert that there is no connection between Oedipus’ 
behaviour on stage and his former crimes
79
 must answer a simple question: what, then, is the 
dramatic purpose of Oedipus’ bad behaviour on stage? Why has Sophocles portrayed him as 
the sort of person who would, unthinkingly and akratically, murder his father and marry his 
mother, if not to indicate that this is exactly what he did? It seems insufficient to say that the 
point of portraying Oedipus as short-tempered is merely to help elicit the emotions of pity 
and fear in the audience, as they observe someone like themselves suffering catastrophe.
80
 
More than that must be at stake. 
 
4 Oedipus and Enlightenment values 
The prediction that Oedipus received from Apollo’s oracle was a response to his question: are 
Polybus and Merope my parents? Instead of answering this question directly, Apollo replied, 
as we noted at the beginning of the chapter, evasively, telling Oedipus that he would kill his 
father and sleep with his mother. Apollo’s failure, like the occasional exam candidate’s, to 
answer the precise question set speaks volumes to us, and should have done so to Oedipus 
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 Oedipus now has three indications that his apparent parents may not be his real parents: 
the drunkard’s words at the feast, calling his origins into question (779–80), Polybus’ and 
Merope’s failure to allay his doubts (781–6)—in the Enescu/Fleg Œdipe, Merope lies to 
Oedipus—and Apollo’s similar refusal to answer a straight question about his parentage 
(788–9).82 The significance of the first piece of evidence is no doubt hard to assess: it might 
be worthless (on the other hand, in vino veritas).
83
 But the latter two pieces of evidence have 
a very high value. An intellectually alert person would put these indications together, infer 
that Polybus and Merope were in all likelihood not his real parents—or at least that this was a 
distinct possibility—and then return to Corinth, at the same time making a mental note of the 
fact that he must, under no circumstances, kill a man old enough to be his father or marry a 
woman old enough to be his mother. Instead, Oedipus takes to the open road and performs 
the contra-indicated acts in short order. That Oedipus really knows that his parentage is 
doubtful is indeed shown by his anxious question to Teiresias (438): ‘Who bore me?’84 Those 
who insist on Oedipus’ moral innocence on the basis that he did not know that the man he 
slew was his father and the woman he then married his mother are, I suggest, missing the 
point, which is that he should have known, or at least strongly suspected, that these identities 
held, and should have entertained these suspicions before he performed the actions of slaying 
and marrying. Putting the point in modern terms, we may say that he has constructive 
knowledge of these facts; that is, he is such, and the circumstances in which he finds himself 
are such, that he ought to have the relevant knowledge (and not just dunamei, but energeiai). 
Ignorance does not, as commentators so often think,
85
 guarantee guiltlessness: it does not do 
so if it is culpable ignorance. (Note that constructive knowledge is distinct from repressed, or 
subconscious, knowledge, though Oedipus may have that too.)
86
 It is not enough to say, as 
Vickers does (1973, 507), that the fact that Oedipus believed his parents to be Polybus and 
Merope and reasoned on that basis clears him of a charge of stupidity. We have to go further 
and ask whether he should have held those beliefs, whether an intelligent person would have 
done so; and the answer is, in both cases, negative. Vickers concedes that Oedipus ‘does not 
ask enough questions’ (ibid., 511); but, like so many other critics, as we have seen, he does 
not think to retrace his steps and revise his view that Oedipus is ‘a supremely . . . intelligent 
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man’ (ibid., 498). By contrast with Sophocles, Aeschylus and Euripides may not have given 
the Oedipus of their versions any inkling of the doubtfulness of his parentage before he 




Before the 2003 Iraq War the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously observed 
that ‘There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are 
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there 
are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.’ What is striking 
about the remark is that, as Steven Pinker observes (2011, 514), Rumsfeld omits the fourth 
category, that of unknown knowns, things we do not know but should, or things knowledge 
of which we are suppressing. Hence a recurring theme of Rowan Williams’s recent book on 
tragedy, namely that ‘tragedy is about the effect upon us of what we do not know’ (2016, 97) 
is too simple. Oedipus is a case in point: the crucial facts are, for him, unknown knowns. So 
Oedipus’ offence, though in one way ‘venial, because unwitting’, as John Dover Wilson 
suggested, contrasting Oedipus’ incest with Gertrude’s (1964, 39), is very far from 
‘innocent’, as Nussbaum calls it.88 Butcher, as we have seen, concedes that ‘in slaying Laius 
[Oedipus] was probably in some degree morally culpable’; but the act of marriage with 
Jocasta, he tells us, ‘was a purely unconscious offence to which no kind of blame attached’ 
(1951, 320). On the contrary, in his marrying of Jocasta as in his slaying of Laius Oedipus’ 
cognitive failure was culpable; it is wrong to suggest that Oedipus exerted himself to avoid 
committing those crimes.
89
 In fact he made very little effort, and the effort that he did make 
(not returning to Corinth) was misguided. Cognitive error is, or can be, morally blameworthy: 
we have obligations to find things out, to reason sensibly about information at our disposal, to 
draw conclusions that stare us in the face, to reckon with probabilities. So, to take another 
Sophoclean example, when Deianeira insouciantly makes use of the potion that Nessus gave 
her, she is cognitively at fault.
90
 Of course, in one way those numerous commentators who 
laud Oedipus’ intelligence are in a better position than I am to impute constructive knowledge 
to Oedipus and so hold him to account: they can say that he should have known the truth 
because he was clever enough to know it. But I can still make my point: Oedipus’ lack of 
intelligence does not exempt him from asking questions that anyone should have asked. 
                                                 
87
 A. Boyle 2011, lii–liii; Schmitt 2011, 481.  
88
 M. Nussbaum 1986, 383; cf. Sorabji 1980, 297. 
89
 So Ahrensdorf 2009, 42. 
90




The tendency to separate the cognitive from the moral should, as I have said, be resisted. 
Vickers is right that older attempts to preserve the notion of tragic flaw by cashing it out 
exclusively in terms of hubris fail (1973, 29–33), but the notion can be retained provided it is 
correctly analysed, and I suggest that ‘cognitive deficiency’ yields the desired analysis, with a 
correspondent understanding of hamartia as cognitive error. So Bywater’s translation of 
‘hamartia’ as ‘error of judgement’ (1920, 50) was right: to speak, as I am doing, of ‘cognitive 
error’ does no more than modernize the terminology. An important Aristotelian point to make 
here, and one that in using the term ‘cognitive’ I presuppose throughout this study, is that the 
cognitive cannot be neatly separated from the appetitive or orectic.
91
 Morality concerns, 
broadly speaking, perception—seeing things in a particular way. And these seen things are 
not motivationally inert. If, for example, I see that someone is in distress and needs help, that 
perception already motivates me to action (which is not to say that I will necessarily act, or 
even that I ought to act: there may be countervailing factors). As far as the notion of hamartia 
is concerned, a crucial implication of this point about cognition is that those tragic mistakes 
which we wish to account for in terms of the notion of akrasia (weakness of will)—and there 
are many such cases—do not form a separate category from that of cognitive error, but fall 
squarely within it. Akrasia is, speaking abstractly, a failure to see the facts in the right way—
that is, in a way that exactly matches the perception of the virtuous agent. 
 
If Oedipus’ reputation for intellectual brilliance is unmerited, how did he acquire it? The 
answer is that he alone solved the riddle of the Sphinx. At first blush this seems an impressive 
achievement, and not only other characters in the play but also critics of it are duly 
impressed. Further investigation reveals the matter to be less straightforward, however, and 
shows that Oedipus’ achievement against the Sphinx is compatible with the lack of 
intelligence that he elsewhere displays. For the Sphinx’s riddle played directly into Oedipus’ 
hands—or perhaps we should say that it played directly to his feet. If there was one sort of 
conundrum that a man of Oedipus’ background, character, obsessions—and, one might add, 
name, for one of the etymologies of his name makes Oedipus ‘the man who knows about 
feet’—was going to have a chance of solving, it was a riddle about feet. (Oedipus puns on 
this etymology of his name and obliquely alludes to the Sphinx’s riddle at line 397. The 
content of the riddle is not mentioned by Sophocles, but that is because it was well known: it 
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seems to have been given in Euripides’ Oedipus.)92 So Oedipus ‘got lucky’: regrettably, it 
turned out to be a unique stroke of luck, which had the unfortunate consequence of distorting 
his and others’ estimation of his abilities. The insight that Oedipus uncharacteristically 
displayed when he solved the Sphinx’s riddle was not repeated, either before or after: it was 
not shown when, in spite of the triple warning he had received, he slew his father and bedded 
his mother, and it is not shown in the play as he gropes his way towards final understanding. 
Perhaps this is felt most strongly when Oedipus fails to respond to Jocasta’s mentioning (718) 
that Laius’ son had had his feet pierced (the fact that lay behind the alternative, more famous, 
etymology of his name, alluded to in the play by the Corinthian messenger).
93
 Everyone in 
the audience solves that riddle, but not Oedipus. So when one critic writes that Sophocles’ 
‘basic dramatic problem is to delay Oedipus’ discovery without straining credibility or 
allowing Oedipus, the great solver of riddles, to appear a fool’,94 we should reply that 
Oedipus is meant to appear a fool; that in turn has implications for what we should say about 
his status as ‘the great solver of riddles’. The first thing to say about that is that, contrary to 
what the plural ‘riddles’ insinuates, before the truth eventually dawns on him Oedipus has 
solved only one riddle.
95
 (The inaccuracy has an interesting precedent in the dramas 
themselves.)
96
 From the beginning of the play he carries around with him riddles about the 
scars on his feet, the identity of his parents, the identity of the man he killed and of the 
woman he married, his own identity—but he has solved none of them.97 The second thing to 
say is that his solving of that single riddle was not a feat of superior intelligence, but a stroke 
of good luck—or rather of bad luck, as it turned out, indeed of tragic misfortune. 
 
It follows that the play is not, as has often been held, in the business of mocking or subverting 
either analytical intelligence or Enlightenment values—Wolfgang Schadewaldt’s Dämonie 
des Wissenwollens um jeden Preis—in the name of a deus absconditus or dim religious 
primitivism.
98
 (Pascal’s idea of a deus absconditus was famously exploited by Lucien 
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Goldmann in his interpretation of Racine;
99
 I shall suggest in Chapter 4 that the idea has 
equally little plausibility in that case, too.) The Oedipus Rex gives no support to the 
Nietzschean idea that Aeschylus and Sophocles promulgate a deeply pessimistic, mysterian, 
irrationalist Weltanschauung, supposedly set against a Socratic rationalism and optimism 
popularized by Euripides.
100
 Nor indeed does the Antigone, to which I turn in the next 
chapter.
101
 Quite the reverse: in both these plays Sophocles precisely upholds Enlightenment 
values of pragmatic intelligence, by demonstrating how a failure to apply them leads to 
catastrophe.
102
 The doctrine of hamartia is itself a fundamentally secularizing and 
rationalizing move on Aristotle’s part,103 so that its application to both the Oedipus Rex and 
(as I shall argue) the Antigone shows that these plays are in the service of the Enlightenment 
project. (There is an irony in Nietzsche’s assertion that tragedy died of Socratism: Socrates 
himself, in the so-called passion dialogues, is in some ways a tragic figure,
104
 who is himself 
brought down by cognitive failure.) Goldhill notes that in the play Oedipus is called the ‘man 
of utmost mastery’ (46) and suggests that ‘even the man of utmost mastery cannot have 
mastery or control in all things. It is precisely the possibility of such total, all-embracing 
resourcefulness or knowledge or mastery that is challenged at the end of this drama’; Goux, 
developing his view of Oedipus as ‘first philosopher’ and precursor of Descartes, tells us that 
it is ‘l’exaltation de l’élément raisonable’ that leads to catastrophe; Richard Rutherford may 
be gesturing at a similar idea when he writes (in Hegelian vein) that ‘misguided heroes are 
often undone by their own strengths (Oedipus, Heracles)’.105 We have seen that Rutherford’s 
point can indeed be applied to Hippolytus. But it does not fit Oedipus: against Goldhill and 
Goux, we must say that Oedipus’ resourcefulness and knowledge and mastery are not total or 
all-embracing; they fall a long way short of that, and this is exactly the problem. So Oedipus 
is not, in the main, undone by his strengths, but by his weaknesses. What we need in the 
Oedipus Rex is not less resourcefulness, but more; it is not the exaltation of l’élément 
raisonable that we see in Oedipus, but its disastrous deficit. 
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Oedipus’ misapplication of rational thought—his failure of intellectual mastery—comes out 
especially clearly in the way he grasps desperately at the discrepancy, mentioned above, 
between the report of robbers, in the plural, given by the survivor of the brawl at the 
crossroads, and his own singular identity. Oedipus and the chorus both hope that this 
discrepancy will save him, but the survivor’s account can only help if one reckons with the 
possibility that Laius and his entourage were killed by robbers and that, at more or less the 
same time and place, a similar elder, travelling with a similar entourage, was killed by 
Oedipus—a collocation of events that is not impossible, but hardly of sufficiently high 
probability to be worth taking seriously.
106
 Oedipus snatches at the difference between plural 
and singular, as though that could be used to prove that he did not kill Laius. He deploys the 
point about singular and plural to combat the point about probabilities, as though the certainty 
that one man could not be identical with many outweighed the mere probability, not certainty, 
that the survivor’s report and his own recollection might home in on the same incident. 
Ironically enough, despite his confidence in the numerical point, there is, as has often been 
observed, a sense in which the discoveries that Oedipus goes on to make show that one can 
be many:
107
 just as Conscience assures the narrator of Piers Plowman that ‘knyghte, kynge, 
conqueroure may be o persone’ (XIX, 27), so too one man can be a homicide and a parricide, 
Thebes’ saviour and its scourge, Laius’ son and slayer, Jocasta’s son and husband, the infant 
exposed on Mount Cithaeron and the ‘child’ of Polybus and Merope. Not that these identities 
upset the logical point, which is that one man cannot be numerically the same as many men. 
They simply trade on the fact that one object may instantiate many properties, together with 
the Fregean point that something which one thinks of under one mode of presentation may 
turn out, perhaps to one’s surprise, to be identical with something which one thinks of under 
another mode of presentation. 
 
Oedipus’ confident belief that to reckon with the possibility that his slaying of an older man 
and entourage at a crossroads, on the one hand, and Laius’ being slain together with his 
entourage at a crossroads by brigands, on the other, were one and the same incident is 
tantamount to supposing the realization of a metaphysical impossibility, namely that he is 
identical with several men, rather than merely showing the survivor of the latter incident to 
have been an unreliable witness (recall Hume on miracles: 1975, 109–31), is another aspect 
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of his cognitive underperformance in the drama. Moreover, the possibility that the survivor 
might deliberately, perhaps for good reasons, have falsified the evidence does not occur to 
him, any more than, in his play, a parallel possibility does to Othello. In addition, Oedipus is 
more concerned with what the survivor said at the time than with what he might say now—
that is, he is more concerned with confirming a convenient story than with finding out the 
truth. Notice also the shift, in their discussion of the mêlée at the crossroads, from Creon’s 
talk of ‘robbers’ (at 122) to Oedipus’ reference to a single ‘robber’ (at 124), a discrepancy 
picked up by Seneca.
108
 It is almost as if Oedipus knows—really knows, that is, not just 
constructively knows. Or perhaps repressed knowledge is surfacing.
109
 Dawe denies that we 
have to do with a Freudian slip (2006, 7). Be that as it may, the mere fact that Oedipus 
represents Creon’s plural as a singular should have alerted him to the possibility that the 
alleged plural was a singular. The move to the singular is, I suggest, the playwright’s way of 
notifying us that Oedipus had an obvious thought available to him which he failed to pursue. 
Some commentators try to defend Oedipus on the grounds that he is entitled to reckon with 
what are, after all, logical possibilities—namely that he is not identical with the son whom 
Laius exposed, or with Laius’ slayer(s), and so on.110 But this misses the point. Of course the 
possibilities on which Oedipus pins his hopes are indeed bare possibilities. (A further bare 
possibility, not entertained by Sophocles’ Oedipus but neatly exploited by Corneille’s, is that 
the wayfarers whom he slew were identical with the ‘brigands’ who murdered Laius.)111 But 
a cognitively alert person would have reckoned with the actual facts, as these turn out to be, 
at a much earlier stage of the investigation than Oedipus does—indeed well before the 
investigation began, namely at the time when he performed the fateful actions. 
 
5 The murder of Laius 
At this point we need to take cognizance of a subtlety which all commentators I have seen 
miss, though one or two get quite close.
112
 Perhaps misled by an over-literal reading of 
Poetics 13 and the fact that the word ‘hamartia’ there occurs in the singular, critics ask what 
Oedipus’ hamartia is, and whether, once we have decided what it is, it is a moral mistake. 
But moralizers, as we have seen, maintain that Oedipus is punished not for his actions on 
stage but for the prior acts of parricide and incest, and these acts evidently constitute not one 
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hamartia, but at least two. I imply in that rider (‘at least’) that they might consist of more 
than two hamartiai, and the subtlety that we now have to register is the point that Oedipus’ 
killing of Laius already and on its own consists of two hamartiai, before ever we get to the 
incest. For on the one hand what occurred between Oedipus and the elder at the crossroads 
was an act of homicide (indeed murder, as I shall argue below in this section), and on the 
other hand it was an act of parricide. In terms of the various kinds of harm that Aristotle lists 
at NE V, 8, the act of homicide (murder) is an adikēma that Oedipus performs with 
knowledge but without forethought, not out of inherent wickedness, but as a consequence of 
anger; the act of parricide, by contrast, counts in Aristotelian metaphysical theory as an 
accidental property (a sumbebēkos) of the killing,113 and as a hamartēma that is like an 
atuchēma except that it could have been foreseen. This last point is crucial: that the killing of 
the elder turned out to be an act of parricide could have been foreseen by Oedipus, since he 
had just received an oracle to that effect; so the act of parricide was indeed a hamartēma and 
not a sheer atuchēma. It would be an atuchēma if it were unpredictable by the relevant agent; 
but in Oedipus’ case that is not so.114 Oedipus’ tragedy is that, while he indeed intended to 
kill a man, in a fit of rage issuing from a flawed nature and precipitating a culpable action, he 
did not intend to kill his father. But the killing was nevertheless an act of parricide, and 
predictably so; that act of parricide polluted Oedipus, and it is what he is punished for. 
 
Does Oedipus deserve his fate? One answer to this question, building on elements of 
Aristotle and Bradley and on what I have just said, might go as follows. Oedipus is unlucky 
inasmuch as an act for which he is fully responsible and which deserves punishment, namely 
homicide (murder), accidentally coincided with an act, namely parricide, for which he is at 
least partially responsible, given his state of knowledge, but which then draws down a 
punishment in excess of his strict deserts. On this view, Oedipus does indeed deserve 
punishment, but not to the extent that he receives it,
115
 an imbalance which is held by both 
Aristotle and Bradley to be an important feature of tragedy,
116
 and which is identified by 
Nietzsche as something that marks out ancient tragedy, by contrast with Christian thought.
117
 
So too, someone might wish to say, with Virgil’s tragic Dido, who blames herself for her fall 
and judges that she deserves death: on the view I am considering she would be right in the 
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first part, but at least partially wrong in the second.
118
 Hera thought that Heracles deserved 
the terrible fate that he meets in Euripides’ Heracles, but an adherent of the view I am 
currently airing might argue that we, the audience, can see that, though he brings his fate on 
himself and is therefore culpable (see further below, §§6 and 8), the punishment goes beyond 
the strict terms of the offence. In the first instance, we might say, divine justice is not human 
justice: it is not, from our point of view, morally ideal.
119
 (What this would in turn come to, in 
the light of the naturalizing move that I shall urge in §8, is that the world is not morally 
ideal.) In Seneca’s Hercules Furens the protagonist thinks that Juno is punishing him (604); 
but though Hercules is, as John Fitch says, ‘brutal and hubristic’ (1987, 276), we might again 
think that the punishment exceeded the offence. In connection with Dionysus’ punishment of 
the whole house of Cadmus for Agave’s and Pentheus’ sins, Dodds remarks that ‘when great 
natural forces are outraged we can expect no nice adjustment of the punishment to the 
magnitude of the individual offence’.120 On the view I am considering here, though the 
punishment is deserved to some extent, it exceeds strict desert, and so is partially just, 
partially unjust. (Incidentally, we should not, as is often done,
121
 equate an imbalance 
between strict desert and punishment with absolute injustice.) The imbalance between 
suffering and desert can then explain why Oedipus’ fate elicits the Aristotelian emotion of 





I have described one possible (in fact, in its general outline, quite common) view about the 
relation between desert and punishment, but our earlier discussion of constructive knowledge 
has already shown where it goes wrong. On the Aristotelo-Bradleian approach, the tragic 
hero(ine) is not wicked, but he or she does have defects of character; these defects do not, as 
such, make the hero(ine) wicked, but do they lead to mistakes which, even when these are of 
a sort that we might be inclined to call ‘intellectual’, are still morally culpable; the 
consequences of the critical actions were both foreseeable and avoidable, and a suitably 
vigilant agent would have foreseen and avoided them. Oedipus, though in one sense ignorant, 
had, as we have said, constructive knowledge of the relevant facts, and should have acted on 
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that knowledge. As Donald Mastronarde observes, the pejorative connotations of a word like 
‘amathēs’ (‘ignorant’), which is often used in a moralizing sense, ‘derives from the implied 
(rationalistic and optimistic) belief that the ignorance is culpable and could have been cured 
by effort’.123 This censure does not apply to all forms of ignorance, but it does apply—
indeed, in morally significant cases, it applies truistically—to ignorance accompanied by 
constructive knowledge; and it is this combination that Oedipus exemplifies. Oedipus’ 
ignorance does not amount to wickedness because, put in Aristotelian terms, his ignorance is 
not of the major premisses of relevant practical syllogisms, but of minor premisses, which 
treat of particularities.
124
 Still, his ignorance of these particularities is not adventitious, but 
grounded in character defects, so that he is genuinely at fault. In general, the agent’s mistake 
or mistakes produce consequences predictably: they arise according to Aristotle’s constraint 
of probability and necessity. It follows that the agent could and should have foreseen them. 
 
Aristotelian pity is, we have said, keyed to a supposed mismatch of punishment and desert. 
But there is a good sense, as I have just implied, in which there is no such mismatch: the 
agent should have foreseen the consequences, or at least foreseen that there might be (serious 
and undesirable) consequences, of his action. In that sense, though the agent is not wicked, it 
is also the case that the punishment is not undeserved, so that there need be no moral deficit 
between desert and punishment, at least according to traditional conceptions of appropriate 
levels of punishment (which are harsher than ours). Does that mean that we cannot feel pity 
for the tragic hero? No. Pity need not be elicited by a feeling that the suffering is undeserved: 
though Aristotle at one point implies otherwise (Rhetoric 1385b13–16), there is no conflict 
between our feeling pity for a tragic agent and that agent’s exhibiting serious culpability.125 
Rowan Williams is quite wrong to say that ‘Explanation and compensation suggest that there 
is something somewhere that makes mourning inappropriate’ (2016, 119). Fully deserved 
suffering—so suffering which is both explicable and compensated (in advance) by fault; 
suffering, that is to say, which is subject to full moral redress—can be, and is, mourned. 
Mourning has a self-regarding aspect, but then we, who are in many cases no better than we 
should be, have reason to fear (Aristotle’s other tragic emotion: Poetics 1453a6) that a similar 
moral and intellectual failure, precipitating catastrophe, will befall us. 
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If Oedipus was lucky with the Sphinx he was unlucky with the killing; and that is the kind of 
thing—at least in general terms—that could happen to anyone. Dodds’s verdict on the play, 
that ‘we feel both pity, for the fragile estate of man, and terror, for a world whose laws we do 
not understand’ (1973, 67) is too loose.126 Our feelings of pity and fear are more precise than 
that. And it is unclear why Dodds finds the ‘laws’ of Sophocles’ world hard to understand. 
Given the coincidences, which, for Aristotle (Metaphysics, . 30 and . 2), are not a matter of 
law, everything happens quite smoothly, according to probability and necessity. Elsewhere, 
Dodds writes that ‘for Homer, as for early thought in general, there is no such thing as 
accident’ (1951, 6). Would this apply to the archaizing Sophocles? You might say that, in an 
absolute sense, there is no such thing as an accident, at least at the level of human affairs. For 
here it is plausible that accidents occur in ways that are relative to causal and explanatory 
chains. That was at any rate Aristotle’s view: for him accidents occur when, for example, 
things behave unexpectedly, given their usual characterizations, as when a cook doctors or a 
doctor cooks; or when two causal chains intersect, as when a creditor goes to market and 
unexpectedly meets his debtor, or a man in a besieged city leaves it to take a drink at an 
outside well and to his consternation finds enemy soldiers there, who kill him (as in some 
versions of Troilus’ death at the hands of Achilles).127 For someone who knew enough about 
the ambient conditions, these coincidences could be predicted and would come as no surprise. 
For the Stoics, an accident is simply an event whose causes are hidden.
128
 Now in Oedipus’ 
case, as we have in effect said, the act of parricide was not much of an accident, in Aristotle’s 
sense, so that it scarcely matters whether we extend Dodds’s point about early Greek thought 
to Sophocles or not. Given the oracle, Oedipus was in a position to predict with near certainty 
that any act of homicide that he subsequently committed on a significantly older man, unless 
he made a habit of performing such acts, was going also to be an act of parricide. It was in a 
relative sense an accident that he met Laius there and then, but it was not an accident in an 
absolute sense, and someone who knew enough about all the relevant causal chains could 
have predicted it, exactly as in the case of the man who leaves the besieged city and 
encounters his mortal enemy at the remote well. This is not to deny that there could be 
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accidents in an absolute sense, a matter on which we need here take no stand; but, if there are 
such accidents, Laius’ death is not one of them. 
 
Dodds states that ‘if Oedipus had been tried before an Athenian court he would have been 
acquitted—of murdering his father’, and Jean-Pierre Vernant opines that Oedipus has not 
‘committed any crime of his own volition (de plein gré)’, or ‘intentionally 
(intentionnellement)’, which could ‘be personally imputed to him from a legal point of 
view’.129 But here Dodds and Vernant slide over an important distinction that I have been at 
pains to stress. No doubt Oedipus would have been acquitted of an intention to commit 
parricide, but would he have been acquitted of murder—the intentional killing of a man? 
Well, whatever the verdict in our hypothetical case would have been, it emerges from the 
manner in which the fateful scene is described that Oedipus’ behaviour on that occasion 
involved an overreaction which went well beyond self-defence—in fact I believe it is clear 
that Oedipus was not in any serious sense under attack from Laius or his retainers
130—and 
that he was guilty of murder, so that in our hypothetical scenario the jury ought not to acquit 
him of that charge.
131
 As Egon Flaig shows, Oedipus cannot plead self-defence, contrary to 
what his apologists have supposed.
132
 (Contrast the versions of the killing of Laius described 
by Euripides’ Jocasta in Phoenician Women, and by Cocteau’s Œdipe in La Machine 
Infernale.)
133
 Let us, following Flaig, reconstruct the scene at Sophocles’ crossroads. 
 
Laius’ servants included a herald, who will have gone before the carriage in order to 
announce his master’s coming and clear the route. He will accordingly have required Oedipus 
to give way, but Oedipus refused, thereby forcing the carriage to brake. In so behaving, 
Oedipus automatically put himself in the wrong, since it was an understood rule in all pre-
modern societies that mere pedestrians, who would normally be members of the lower orders, 
had to yield passage to nobility riding on horseback or in vehicles. (This point, implicit in 
Sophocles, emerges explicitly in Euripides’ version at Phoenician Women 39–41, where 
Laius’ driver abruptly tells Oedipus to make way for royalty.) Anyone who flouted this 
convention could justifiably be regarded as a potential highwayman and treated 
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appropriately; indeed highwaymen caught in the act could be killed with impunity.
134
 Now, 
as it happened, this pedestrian was in fact—and exceptionally—a nobleman, but given that 
other travellers could not know of his exceptional status Oedipus incurred an obligation to 
play by the rules. So his refusal to get out of the way was the primum malum and a deliberate 
act of provocation. However, in spite of their entitlement to initiate physical violence, Laius 
and his entourage did not do so: by his own account, it was Oedipus himself who did that, 
striking the driver (807).
135
 And, even if we ignore the blow to the driver, we should remind 
ourselves that when two parties engage in a quarrel that descends to physical violence, he 
who strikes first is not necessarily the true initiator of violence.
136
 Melville’s Billy Budd is a 
good illustration of this point; it is also understood by Goethe’s Duke Alfonso of Ferrara 
when Tasso draws his sword against Antonio;
137
 and Euripides’ Medea tries to avail herself 
of the same point against Jason (1366, 1372). In fact Oedipus did strike first, in a physical 
sense, when he lashed out at the driver, but he also originated violence in a deeper sense by 
blocking the entourage’s passage. Laius now retaliated, as he had by this stage more than 
good cause to do, hitting Oedipus on the head with his goad. This response was mild by 
comparison with what Laius and his retainers would have been entitled to mete out: at this 
point in the proceedings they would have been justified in inferring nefarious motives on the 
stranger’s part, and killing him. Unfortunately for them, however, they did not do so, and 
Oedipus replied with disproportionate (810) and illegitimate force, in his rage killing Laius 
and all but one of his servants. It is a measure of his violence and excess that he caused these 
deaths not with a sword or spear, but with a staff. Oedipus in fact committed multiple 
murders. And the crucial point is that, as Flaig puts it, ‘even if he did not wish deliberately to 
kill Laius as his father, he nevertheless did deliberately kill the man who coincidentally was 
his father’ (1998, 101–2). 
 
Michael Lurje’s interpretation of the play hinges on the thesis that the kind of double 
hamartia I have outlined is impossible: given that the act of parricide was a hamartēma, the 
killing could not have been an adikēma, because we have to do with one and the same act, 
and the former description trumps and excludes the latter.
138
 But an Aristotelian will not be 
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impressed by that reasoning: qua killing of his father Oedipus’ act was a hamartēma, qua 
killing of a man it was an adikēma; these two aspects simply co-exist in balance and there is 
no question of one’s trumping or excluding the other. Indeed Aristotle appears to imply 
almost exactly this, with Oedipus in mind, when he remarks, in the context of a distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary acts of striking, that ‘the person struck may be the agent’s 
father, though the agent knows only that he is a human being or one of the people present, 
and is unaware that he is his father’.139 The so-called ‘mixed actions’ of NE III, 1 provide 
another model of how a single act can, in Aristotle’s view, partake of both the voluntary and 
the involuntary: the captain who throws his cargo overboard in a storm acts involuntarily 
simpliciter, since he would not choose to be in the circumstances in which he finds himself; 
but relative to those circumstances his action is voluntary, since its moving principle lies in 
him and the particular action of jettisoning the cargo is not externally imposed. Such 
relativization of the correct characterization of a situation to the way it is viewed is staple 
Aristotelian fare. After the revelations of Oedipus’ past, the chorus states (1213) that ‘time 
the all-seeing hath found thee out in thy despite (akonta; tr. Jebb)’. Oedipus is characterized 
here as akōn (unintending, unwilling) because, although he pursued the investigation hekōn 
(intentionally, willingly), he did not intend the outcome, of which he was ignorant, and the 
outcome caused him grief and regret.
140
 As comparison with Aristotle’s discussion of the 
voluntary and involuntary shows, Oedipus’ is a perfectly straightforward case of mixed 
akousion and hekousion. 
 
6 Culpability, tragic heroes, and poetic justice 
Dodds remarks that ‘the theory that the tragic hero must have a grave moral flaw, and its 
mistaken ascription to Aristotle, has had a long and disastrous history. It was gratifying to 
Victorian critics, since it appeared to fit certain plays of Shakespeare’ (1973, 67). I have 
argued that an Aristotelian hamartia, though not identical with a moral flaw, does issue from 
one. Moreover, the theory does fit certain plays of Shakespeare: as Bradley noted (1991, 28–
31, 37, 45), Shakespeare’s tragic heroes contribute to their own downfall, and they do so by 
performing (or omitting) actions of a fateful nature that express their character, so that if the 
action (or inaction) is flawed, that is because the underlying character is flawed. James 
Shapiro reads Julius Caesar as Hegel read the Antigone: ‘Shakespeare didn’t conceive of his 
tragedy in Aristotelian terms—that is, as a tragedy of the fall of a flawed great man—but 
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rather as a collision of deeply held and irreconcilable principles, embodied in characters who 
are destroyed when these principles collide’ (2005, 147). But Brutus is an Aristotelian hero, 
and his repeated misjudgements—his cognitive failures—are there to be seen on the surface 
of the work.
141
 Butcher thought that Sophocles’ Oedipus and Shakespeare’s Othello ‘differ 
[widely] in moral guilt’ (1951, 322), but it is hard to see how this can be so, for they share the 
same basic flaw: culpable cognitive failure. In Oedipus’ case the flaw takes the form of an 
inability to make proper use of information at his disposal; in Othello’s case it takes the form 
of suggestibility and gullibility. Othello forgets that testimony is not cognitively equivalent to 
perception:
142
 for in the case of testimony, unlike that of perception, there is an interface, an 
intermediary in the form of a human decision to act as a conduit of information (or 
misinformation), and this fact requires any sensible recipient to ask after the testimony 
giver’s credentials and reliability. Even perception, though it does not involve an interface, 
can be unreliable, and misinterpreted, as Othello illustrates. (A similar point applies to 
Voltaire’s Zaïre, which is partly based on Othello: Orosmane misconstrues the letter to Zaïre 
that his officers intercept.) That tragedians build flaws into their heroes is what you would 
expect; for, whether consciously or not, they prefer to conform to Aristotle’s dictum that 
narrated events should arise by probability and necessity, as well as to a principle of 
sufficient reason along Leibnizian lines. And, as we have said (§2), the most satisfying 
explanation of a tragic hero’s fall is that he brought it on himself. 
 
Of the six tragic heroes that Aristotle lists in Poetics 13 as being the most effective—
Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, Thyestes, and Telephus—we know from elsewhere 
in his œuvre that Aristotle thought at least two of them to be culpable, Alcmaeon and 
Orestes.
143
 The presence in this list of Orestes, in particular, has always been a thorn in the 
side of those critics who take Aristotelian hamartia to be, or involve, a mere ‘mistake of 
fact’—that is, for these critics, an essentially non-moral kind of ignorance.144 (On the wider, 
realist–cognitivist view of morality that I, like Aristotle, am following, there is no harm in 
saying that a hamartia involves ignorance of matters of fact, so long as one remembers that 
the relevant facts may be moral in nature.) As for Thyestes, it is unclear which version of the 
myth Aristotle is thinking of, but it could be the famous story of Thyestes’ seducing his 
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brother Atreus’ wife Aerope, ‘for which Atreus revenged himself by pretending to forgive 
Thyestes and then serving him up his children’s flesh at a banquet’, as D. W. Lucas reminds 
us (1972, 145). But if that is what Aristotle has in mind it is not true, as Lucas goes on to say, 
that the only instance of hamartia in the offing is the fact that Thyestes did not know what he 
was eating, for that interpretation depends on an exclusively non-moral conception of 
hamartia. In the Laws, Plato refers to the tragedies of Oedipus and Thyestes as involving just 
punishments for serious crimes, and there is a neat match between Thyestes and the figure in 
the Republic’s Myth of Er who greedily chooses the lot of the tyrant, only to find that he is 
destined to eat his own children. Destined—but when he understands his fate he bewails it, 
forgetting ‘that his misfortunes were his own fault, blaming fate and heaven and anything but 
himself’.145 So four of the six cases listed by Aristotle—Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, and 
Thyestes—seem to involve moral hamartiai and a hero who brings trouble on himself. The 
final two cases, Meleager and Telephus, may follow suit, though we do not know enough 
about the versions of their stories that Aristotle presupposed to be sure of this. 
 
The pattern of culpable error balanced by punishment is exemplified by the majority, and the 
most important, of Greek tragic heroes and heroines, from Homer’s Hector, Aeschylus’ 
Xerxes, Eteocles, Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, and the Prometheus of the Prometheus 
Vinctus, through Sophocles’ Antigone and Creon (theme of my next chapter), his Ajax, 
Heracles, and Deianeira, to Euripides’ Medea, Hippolytus, Phaedra, and Pentheus, and the 
post-Euripidean Rhesus.
146
 Even Euripides’ mad Heracles, who in the view of some 
commentators fails to conform to this pattern,
147
 can be fitted into it without strain, as the 
early Wilamowitz saw (though he later seems to have changed his mind)
148—Seneca’s mad 
Hercules still more so.
149
 Similarly, in the Senecan Hercules on Oeta we find a heightening 
of Deianeira’s guilt: not only does she initially wish to kill Hercules in revenge for his 
infidelity, but when she moves instead to the application of Nessus’ supposed aphrodisiac, 
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her culpable negligence in not suspecting treachery on the centaur’s part is made even plainer 
than it is in Sophocles (see 716–21); though both the Nurse and Hyllas try to absolve her of 
guilt (884–6, 900–1, 982–3), she refuses to absolve herself. And Seneca’s Thyestes, 
Agamemnon, and Medea are obvious exemplars of the type,
150
 as is Virgil’s Dido and 
Lucan’s Pompey. Arguably Virgil’s Turnus also exemplifies the type; possibly even, in some 
measure, his Aeneas.
151
 After Seneca, we find the syndrome replicated throughout the entire 
European tragic tradition, as for instance by the Roland of the Chanson, Siegfried, Hagen, 
and Kriemhild in the Nibelungenlied, Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde and Henryson’s 
Cresseid, Aretino’s Celia (Orazio), Buchanan’s Jephtha, Norton and Sackville’s Gorboduc, 
Hughes’s Arthur and Mordred (The Misfortunes of Arthur), Wilmot’s Tancred, Gismund, and 
Palurin, Garnier’s Thésée, Alabaster’s Oromasdes (Roxana), Locrine in the play of that name, 
Marlowe’s Faustus, Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Jonson’s Sejanus, Webster’s Duchess of Malfi, 
Beaumont and Fletcher’s Evadne and Amintor (The Maid’s Tragedy), Middleton and 
Rowley’s Beatrice (The Changeling), Milton’s Samson, Corneille’s Suréna, Racine’s Phèdre, 
Voltaire’s Tancrède, Lessing’s Emilia Galotti, Goethe’s Götz von Berlichingen, Schiller’s 
Wallenstein, Kleist’s Penthesilea, Hebbel’s Agnes Bernauer, Büchner’s Danton, Grillparzer’s 
Rahel, George Eliot’s Lydgate, Hardy’s Michael Henchard, Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, Ibsen’s Hjalmar (Wild Duck), Strindberg’s Miss Julie, and 
Synge’s Deirdre of the Sorrows. This list does not aim at anything like completeness, but is 
simply meant to indicate the range of applicability of the hamartia doctrine. (For example, 
the model applies not just to Hamlet, but to all of Shakespeare’s tragic heroes.) I have already 
briefly mentioned Faustus and Samson, and shall say more about a number of other cases in 
the above list in due course, especially some of the more controversial ones. 
 
Dodds traces the idea he is attacking to ‘older nonsense about “poetic justice” ’, an idea 
which he says is ‘completely foreign to Aristotle and to the practice of the Greek 
dramatists’.152 The idea of poetic justice is the idea that rewards and punishments are 
distributed to the good and bad respectively not as a consequence of a procedure—that would 
be legal justice—but by chance: the charitable woman wins the lottery; the felon falls off a 
cliff. So ‘poetic justice’ is a technical term with a precise meaning: a case of justice in a poem 
is not eo ipso a case of poetic justice. Now the notion of poetic justice is arguably not foreign 
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to Aristotle, given that the concept of the philanthrōpon—that which satisfies human feeling, 
an idea which is very close to the idea of poetic justice—is aired in Poetics 13, and seems to 
be almost as important to him as the concepts of pity and fear.
153
 Still, whatever we should 
say about the practice of the Greek dramatists in general, I agree with Dodds, and have in 
effect argued here, that poetic justice plays no role in the Oedipus Rex: the faults that Oedipus 
discloses during the dramatic action of that work are not there to justify his punishment in 
any poetic sense, but to reveal his character—a character that at an earlier stage in the story 
did produce actions that were punishable, and are now to be punished. Stinton suggests that a 
thesis which I argued for above, namely that hamartia serves to measure the moral distance 
between the intermediate tragic hero and the fully virtuous person, is ‘a fatal step, if it leads 
(as it has sometimes led) to crediting—or debiting—Aristotle with the notion of poetic 
justice’ (1990, 165). But there is no need for this undesirable consequence to ensue. It is true 
that the hero’s hamartia in a given tragedy could be in the service of poetic justice, because 
there might be no causal connection between that hamartia and the hero’s punishment: the 
hamartia could be there simply to make the audience feel comfortable with that punishment 
in a non-legalistic way. But that is not, I suggest, either Aristotle’s recommendation or 
Sophocles’ policy in the Oedipus Rex or what we find in the tragic tradition generally. As I 
have argued, dramatic economy favours an appropriate causal connection between the hero’s 
moral deficiencies and catastrophe, and that is what we find in the case of Oedipus and most 
tragic hero(in)es. On the one hand hamartia expresses character; on the other hand it 
precipitates punishment. 
 
7 Oedipus and freedom 
Is Oedipus free? Dodds’s position on this question is straightforwardly inconsistent.154 In the 
first section of ‘On Misunderstanding Oedipus Rex’, where he argues against the moralizing 
interpretation, Dodds claims that Oedipus was not free to act otherwise in slaying his father 
and marrying his mother, because that was what the oracle had unconditionally predicted that 
he would do. But in rebutting the idea that the play is a ‘tragedy of destiny’, in the second 
section of his essay, he proceeds to urge the precise opposite, namely that Oedipus was free 
to act otherwise, because, as it is now conceded, divine foreknowledge does not amount to 
divine determination. Dodds’s second position is much better than his first. For the 
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suggestion that since the oracle was unconditional Oedipus could not have avoided his fate 
involves a modal error. From the fact that Oedipus will do such and such—that is what the 
oracle predicts—it does not follow that he must do such and such. The divine being can 
predict human free action without undermining that freedom, because it has factored in to its 
prediction not only the results of the human agent’s free deliberation, but also the effect of its 
making the prediction and of its revealing the prediction to that human agent in advance, if it 
does. (Similarly, Christ’s prediction to Peter that he would deny him three times takes 
account of the fact that Peter hears the prediction; when the time comes, Peter’s denials are 
free.)
155
 Hence Oedipus can be free not to do what he is predicted—and predicted with 
absolute certainty—to do. For if he were not to do what he is predicted to do, then the oracle 
would not have made that prediction. The oracle merely knows that Oedipus will do such and 
such, not that he must do it, and knows also that divulging the prediction to the human agent 
will not affect—indeed will exactly contribute to the bringing about of—that outcome: in 
mathematical terms the prediction of that action is a fixed point. As Boethius noted, God’s 
seeing that I will do something no more detracts from my freedom than my seeing you doing 
something now detracts from yours.
156
 And it would be a species of category error to suggest 
here that Oedipus could not have acted otherwise because the myth was settled and known 
and Sophocles could not change it: the myth may have been fixed and familiar to all, but in 




It might be objected to my argument of the previous paragraph that it ignores an important 
historical and an equally important linguistic point. The historical point would be that, even if 
it is a modal error to confuse ‘will’ and ‘must’, it is an error that many people have 
committed, including most famously Aristotle. In the ninth chapter of De Interpretatione, 
Aristotle—at least according to the traditional interpretation of this passage158—feels obliged 
to restrict, with respect to statements about future contingencies,  the principle that every 
statement is either true or false, on the grounds that if statements about the future were true 
(false) the corresponding events would thereby be rendered necessary (impossible). So, it 
might be said, if Aristotle can infer a ‘must’ from a ‘will’, it would hardly be surprising if 
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Sophocles did so too. The linguistic point is this. It is sometimes claimed that the oracle that 
Oedipus receives from Apollo is expressed in ‘must’ terms.159 Oedipus tells Jocasta that 
Apollo prophesied terrible things for him, ‘even that I was fated (chreiē) to defile my 
mother’s bed; and that I should show (dēlōsoim’) unto men a brood which they could not 
endure to behold; and that I should be (esoimēn) the slayer of the sire who begat me’ (791–3, 
tr. Jebb). Jebb translates the crucial impersonal verb ‘chrē’ (here occurring in the optative 
form ‘chreiē’) as ‘is fated’, which is a standard rendering (Lloyd-Jones has ‘was 
destined’).160 Note that Sophocles also uses future tenses (dēlōsoim’, esoimēn) for what 
Apollo says Oedipus is ‘fated’ to do. Now ‘chrē’ has a range of meanings, including one that 
is close to a pure future tense, often translated ‘is to be’,161 which is also a standard meaning 
of the verb ‘mellein’.162 In this sense fate simply represents a jumping up of the actual to the 
necessary. As A. F. Garvie writes on Aeschylus, Persae 908–17: ‘In his despair Xerxes 
makes no attempt to understand why everything has gone so wrong. It has happened, so it 
must have been fated to happen’. Hence the meaning of Oedipus Rex 791 might be simply 
‘that I was to . . .’ rather than the modally weightier ‘that I was fated/obliged to . . .’. 
However, it is clear from Aristotle’s discussion of future contingency alone, not to mention 
many other passages, that for Greek (as indeed for modern) thought the idea of what will 
happen is often felt to be close to the idea of what must happen. That is especially so in 
epistemic contexts. If you know what will happen, it is natural to think that that can only be 
so because what will happen also must happen: for how else could you know? Someone who 
knows the future has, plausibly, tapped into a necessary process and extrapolated the 
outcome. Seriously entertaining the idea that the future might be metaphysically determinate, 
and even foreknown, but not necessary was largely an achievement of late antique and 
medieval thought.
163
 So it would be reasonable for my objector to insist that the future tenses 
in the quoted passage, and the use of ‘chrē’, are at least not clearly distinguished from the 
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My response to this historico-linguistic objection is that, even if Sophocles thinks that 
Oedipus, in some sense, must do what he does (these being the terms, according to the 
objection, in which Apollo issues the prophecy), he is nevertheless a fully free agent.
165
 I here 
presuppose compatibilism about freedom, and I rely on the simple fact that Oedipus is 
described as acting like a free agent. In the story he makes choices, and is under no duress 
when he makes them; for a compatibilist about freedom that is good enough to ensure that the 
actions really are free, provided they also meet a rationality constraint. This is so regardless 
of whatever subterranean necessities (physical or theological) may be operative. At the 
surface level, the level of actions and their typical characterizations, of reasons for action and 
agent rationality, of presence or absence of duress, and so on—and it is on that surface where, 
according to the compatibilist, freedom exists—Oedipus does not have to do what he does. 
To the extent that we are inclined to say that he must do what he does, that simply reflects an 
ex post facto inference from the factual to the fated: he did it, so it ‘was to be’.166 Vickers 
distinguishes between Oedipus’ actions during the play, and his critical actions beforehand, 
arguing that the former are free and the latter not (1973, 498–500); but I see no relevant 
distinction. The fact that Oedipus killed Laius and married Jocasta in ignorance of their 
relations to himself does not derogate from the freedom of those acts. Vickers suggests that 
‘freedom means—at the very least—that I am able to act and control my actions with full 
knowledge of who I am’ (ibid., 499). But this sets much too high a standard for freedom. We 
never have that degree of knowledge: it cannot be the case that if, say, I unearth some old 
family documents which reveal that I have hitherto been in error about my paternity, I must 
judge that my actions to date have not been free. 
 
Tragedies always involve contingency—in particular free action, and often sheer coincidence 
as well. Relatedly, as Bradley reminded us in one of his most memorable passages, events 
have a habit of turning out otherwise than intended.
167
 True, the ingredients of catastrophe are 
generally all there from the beginning—the flawed characters, the latent deceits and 
falsehoods waiting to be exposed, the ambient hatreds, and so on. But a priori it is not a 
given that those ingredients will combine in just the right way for tragedy; things might just 
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as well proceed in the same old uneventful way. For every actual tragic event, there are many 
such events that could occur but do not, because the necessary conditions are not assembled 
at the right time, in the right place, or in the right order. How easily might Hamlet have lived 
to old age happily married to Ophelia, as George Eliot once mused (1979, 514). So I do not 
think we should agree with Stanley Cavell when he writes (2003, 112): 
Of course if Othello had not met Iago, if Lear had not developed his plan of division, 
if Macbeth had not listened to his wife. . . . But could these contingencies have been 
prevented? If one is assured that they could have been, one is forgetting who these 
characters are. For if, for example, Othello hadn’t met Iago he would have created 
another, his magnetism would have selected him, and the magic of his union would 
have inspired him. So a radical necessity haunts every story of tragedy. 
On the contrary, we may reply, Othello’s tragedy depends on a sequence of contingencies: 
Iago’s high-wire act could at any moment have crashed to earth. The preconditions for 
tragedy—depending, as Cavell says, on character, and especially on the lack of mutual 
understanding between Othello and Desdemona
168—were all in place, but it needed a 
particular and highly contingent combination of circumstances, including crucial free 
decisions on the part of the main agents, for tragedy to be activated.
169





Euripides’ Cassandra says that if the Greeks had stayed at home, Hector’s virtues would not 
have shone forth (Trojan Women 395–7); just so, and he would also not have been tragic. 
Horst Steinmetz draws our attention to the bizarre array of coincidences that characterizes 
Lessing’s Emilia Galotti, and suggests that the play could just as well have ended as a 
comedy; A. D. Nuttall remarks that Romeo and Juliet moves from comic to tragic form.
171
 
But it is true of all tragedies that in imaginable counterfactual scenarios catastrophe would 
have been averted: it is true of the Antigone, for instance, that if Creon had elected to release 
Antigone before burying Polyneices no one would have died; what if Edmund’s final 
message in King Lear had not arrived too late?
172
 Conversely, in plays of the ‘catastrophe 
survived’ genre, the aversion of disaster often depends on pure luck, of which Euripides made 
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such good use in his recognition plays.
173
 It is important to add here that it does not follow, as 
Steinmetz also claims, that Emilia Galotti’s reliance on coincidence in any way lessens the 
guilt of the principal agents or their responsibility for catastrophe. We are responsible for the 
errors we commit even when (as is invariably the case) other causal factors contribute to the 
ensuing of undesirable consequences. No one is causally isolated when he performs an 
action. So I think that Cavell is wrong to banish contingency from the tragedies of Othello, 
Lear, and Macbeth, but what is right in the quoted passage is the emphasis on the importance 
of character. We need to hold in balance the twin points that tragedy involves contingency, 
but that protagonists’ fates play out their characters in ways that conform to the Aristotelian 
requirements of probability and necessity. Bradley saw the matter clearly: ‘The dictum that, 
with Shakespeare, “character is destiny” is no doubt an exaggeration, and one that may 
mislead (for many of his tragic personages, if they had not met with peculiar circumstances, 
would have escaped a tragic end, and might even have lived fairly untroubled lives); but it is 
the exaggeration of a vital truth’ (1991, 29–30). 
 
Free action and the accidental are both species of contingency, but they need to be kept 
distinct. Aristotle fails properly to include, as a feature of tragedy, contingency in the sense of 
the accidental, and this omission, as I have just in effect implied, is a mistake on his part, 
since tragedy is replete with that kind of contingency. No doubt Aristotle suppresses mention 
of the accidental because he thinks that it would not square with his doctrine that events in a 
tragedy must follow upon one another according to principles of probability and necessity.
174
 
But what he should have done was hedge that doctrine, not ignore the very evident 
importance of the accidental in tragic plots. (Aristotle does allow contingency to feature 
‘outside the play’, and in its initial conditions, but he excludes it from the tragic action 
itself.)
175
 Free action, by contrast, conforms to the doctrine—at least according to anyone 
who thinks in a compatibilist way about freedom, as it is plausible that Aristotle did.
176
 And 
the compatibilist is right to insist that our central cases of freedom are rational, predictable 
actions—actions that are performed for good and sufficient reasons—not mad, unpredictable 
ones. If serving God is the most rational thing to do, then his service is indeed perfect 
freedom, as the Collect has it, provided my decision is to enter into that service is not forced 
                                                 
173
 See Bond on Euripides, Heracles 513f. 
174
 Cf. Gellrich 1988, 104–25.  
175
 See Poetics 1450b27–8, 1454b6–8, 1460a27–32; Barnwell 1982, 219–21; Heath 1991, 394–5. 
176
 Everson 1990; pace Vernant in Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 2001, vol. 1, 59–61. 
61 
 
on me by others. Tragic plots revolve around rational, predictable, free actions. For tragedy 
‘is deeply concerned with decision’:177 it is striking that quotations and discussions of tragic 
works in antiquity tend to focus on the ethical dilemmas and aporias that they present,
178
 and 
it would be hard to think of a single tragic work in the tradition that does not involve at least 
one structurally important decision somewhere in its plot. Even tragedies of inaction, such as 
(perhaps) some of Chekhov’s or Beckett’s plays, fall under this rubric: for a decision to do 





Free action is action that, like all contingency, ‘could have gone otherwise’, as we often put 
it. Aeschylus’ Agamemnon donned the strap that tied him to the yoke of necessity (218), but 
he did so freely. Aeschylus’ language at the crucial point in the work is focalized, reflecting 
Agamemnon’s own feelings of compulsion: he simply cannot bear the alternative to 
sacrificing his daughter, namely desertion of the fleet. But the words that express his dilemma 
(205–27) make clear that he has a real choice.180 Pelasgus too, in the Suppliants, feels that he 
is acting under necessity (440, 478), but his decisions are clearly free. Again, both 
Agamemnon and Pelasgus are described as acting freely: it is not that Agamemnon could not 
desert the expedition; it is not that Pelasgus could not ignore the Danaids’ threat; it is just that 
these alternatives seem comparatively unattractive.
181
 Similarly, in saying that Oedipus did 
what he did freely, I imply that he had a genuine choice in the matter, that he could have 
acted otherwise—at all relevant stages of the story, both before he received Apollo’s oracle 
and afterwards—than the way he did act.182 W. H. Auden once remarked that ‘Greek tragedy 
is the tragedy of necessity: i.e., the feeling aroused in the spectator is “What a pity it had to be 
this way”; Christian tragedy is the tragedy of possibility, “What a pity it was this way when it 
might have been otherwise” ’;183 but Auden’s motto for Christian tragedy also applies to 
Greek, and indeed all, tragedy. Of course, as Kierkegaard remarked (1987, vol. 1, 143), free 
action is not performed in a vacuum, but in a context of substantial constraints. But the 
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presence of such a context does not derogate from freedom: quite the reverse. Free action is 
essentially rational, as we have said,
184
 and rational action is constituted as such by being 
situated in a context that gives it identity, that makes demands and supplies reasons. Action in 
a social and rational vacuum would not be free, but mad (or would not be action at all). A 
good illustration of this point is provided by Ellida’s decision at the end of Ibsen’s The Lady 
from the Sea. Ellida cannot resolve her impasse until she is permitted to decide in full 
freedom. But the freedom of her decision consists principally in the absence of duress from 
her husband: it does not require—and could indeed not be made in—a context devoid of 
operative causes and reasons. The freedom of the tragic hero or heroine is not constituted 
merely by the capacity to take a reflective attitude, perhaps as envisaged by the early 
Wittgenstein, to his or her situation;
185
 it is constituted by an ability to make a difference to 
the world, given genuine alternatives.
186
 Nothing in the compatibilist story about freedom 
requires us to deny this evident truth. 
 
There is an important logical point that needs to be mentioned here. Someone might object to 
my argument as follows: at any given moment, the past in respect of that moment is 
unalterable, so a past oracle and its content are fixed at that moment; if in addition we assume 
that Apollo’s oracle, say, made an infallible prediction concerning Oedipus’ future actions, 
then, when the time comes for him to act, how can Oedipus do other than what he does? The 
necessity of the past, along with the necessity of the connection between prediction and 
predicted outcome, import the necessity of that predicted outcome, by dint of a familiar 
transfer-of-necessity principle, common to all modal systems: if the antecedent of an 
implication is necessary, and the implication is itself necessary, then the consequent is 
necessary, too. (The transfer principle was denied by Luis de Molina, founder of the 
important doctrine of middle knowledge; but few have followed him in this.)
187
 In order to 
escape from this bind, it looks as though we must either tolerate backwards causation, or give 
up the infallibility of the oracle, or both. That is, it seems that we must say either that 
Oedipus later has the power to bring it about that Apollo did not make the earlier prediction, 
or that he has the power to bring it about that the earlier prediction, though fixed, was in 
error, or both. The first option involves tampering with the necessity of the past, something 
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that most thinkers have been unwilling to do ever since the tragedian Agathon, as Aristotle 
reports him, declared that the one thing even god cannot do is to reverse what has happened 
(NE 1139b9–11).188 What about the second option? In the context of medieval Christian 
debates on these matters, thinkers were understandably reluctant to countenance the idea of a 
deus fallens, of a god who makes predictions that turn out to be false.
189
 Whether pagan gods 
can make false predictions is a moot point. Plato preserves a beautiful fragment of Aeschylus 
in which Thetis accuses Apollo of falsely prophesying long life for her future son Achilles.
190
 
But, as Robert Parker points out, it may be that ‘Thetis had misunderstood the god’s riddling 
words (in which, certainly, she deserves all our sympathy)’ (1999, 21). Thetis construed his 
words in one way, and understood in that way they turned out to be false, but there was an 
alternative interpretation, perhaps, which rendered them true. As Chaucer’s Criseyde puts it, 
For goddes speken in amphibologies, 
 And for o soth they tellen twenty lyes.
191
 
That is certainly one way of saving Apollo’s credibility in the face of Thetis’ accusation: his 
words were ambiguous. But there is another way. 
 
The Christian God, being omniscient, must be presumed to know the meaning of his own 
predictions. But in a pagan context the parallel assumption that divine oracles know the 
meaning of their own predictions generates a crucial subtlety that eases the logical bind I 
mentioned in the last paragraph. For although pagan oracles know in general terms what their 
predictions mean, they do not always know their precise meaning; and, by contrast with the 
Christian God, pagan oracles often do not know in detail how their predictions will be 
realized. Parker again notes that ‘there are strict limits to what is actually revealed even 
through the especially authoritative medium of prophecy. You will kill your father and marry 
your mother, Oedipus is warned; neither he nor we learn why’ (1999, 14). Nor—and this is 
the point here—do we learn how. Indeed it is usual with ancient oracles that the manner and 
circumstances of their fulfilment are left unstated. For one thing, it will normally be 
indeterminate when the oracle is to be realized:
192
 so Darius, in Aeschylus’ Persae, pins his 
hopes on the possibility that the prophesied disaster may lie in the distant future (739–41). 
More importantly in the present context, oracular predictions may leave open the possibility 
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of a metaphorical implementation.
193
 No doubt it is fixed that Oedipus will in some sense kill 
his father and sleep with his mother, but in what sense will he do these things? ‘Father’ and 
‘mother’ often carry the metaphorical meaning of ‘homeland’;194 so killing one’s father and 
sleeping with one’s mother might in the event amount to no more than (say) plunging a sword 
or spear into the earth of one’s native land and then lying down to rest on one’s native soil.195 
Rutherford remarks, in line with Parker’s suggestion above about Aeschylus’ Thetis: ‘Those 
who have heard the god’s pronouncement often misunderstand it, misremember it, or hope 
that it will remain unfulfilled. But in tragedy oracular predictions are always fulfilled’.196 
True, but there is another possibility, which is that the oracle is indeterminate in meaning, so 
that although tragic agents know, or should know, that oracular predictions are always 
fulfilled, they often do not know, and sometimes cannot know—because it cannot be known; 
it is simply not yet fixed—in what sense the oracle will be fulfilled. It is not merely that the 
recipients cannot imagine how the oracle will be fulfilled:
197
 there may be literally nothing 
there, as yet, to imagine. Until it is fulfilled, it may just be indeterminate what the meaning of 
the prediction was. This indeterminacy is more radical than the standard indeterminacy of the 




We can go further. Oedipus could have decided to perform the actions I have mentioned 
precisely in order to defuse the oracle, by making it come true harmlessly. When the harpy 
Celaeno predicts to Virgil’s Aeneas and his men that they will end up devouring the very 
tables in their hunger, it is fixed, we might say, that they will indeed eat their tables, in some 
sense, but not fixed in what sense they will do so. And in fact the prediction is fulfilled in the 
most banal way, when Ascanius interprets the bannocks they eat on reaching Italy as their 
‘tables’.199 Ascanius thereby lays the curse to rest: it would be absurd for Aeneas (or the 
reader) to worry that the Trojans might still, even after eating their tables metaphorically, 
have to consume them in a literal sense, on the grounds that that was what Celaeno meant. 
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Celaeno did not mean anything so definite: the metaphorical realization of the prediction is 
quite sufficient to satisfy the metaphysical demands of the poem and its oracles. Admittedly 
Celaeno did mean to predict something unpleasant for Aeneas and his men, and in that she 
turns out to be wrong; but that is a mere matter of detail, and classical—by contrast with 
Christian—theology has no difficulty with it. So we might say that the classical position is 
that a certain amount of anti-realism about past meaning is allowed: that is, while in general 
terms the content of an oracle is fixed at the time of its pronouncement, its precise meaning 
remains to be determined by subsequent events and by the relevant agent(s). (There is all the 
difference in the world between literally and metaphorically eating tables: that is matter of 
meaning.) Hence, having received the Delphic oracle, it remained open to Oedipus to 
undertake not to kill his father and marry his mother in the literal sense; he might have 
avoided these actions, but if he had done so then one day it would no doubt have become 
clear to him that there was a metaphorical sense in which he had fulfilled the prediction, 
perhaps quite harmlessly. And, as I have said, he might have deliberately undertaken to 
realize the prediction innocuously, in order to defuse it. That deflecting manoeuvre, had 
Oedipus engaged in it, might to be sure have been unsuccessful; then again, it might have 
worked. 
 
Suppose, however, that my objector refuses all this, and insists on both the necessity of the 
past and (implausibly, I suggest) the determinate meaning of Apollo’s oracle; in that case, 
and modulo those assumptions, the compatibilist about freedom must agree that, in a 
metaphysical sense, Oedipus’ foretold actions are necessary. But then the compatibilist’s 
whole point is that such underlying necessities, whether physical, theological, or (as we have 
just been exploring) temporal, are irrelevant to real freedom. Real freedom is social or 
political: it involves having the power to do as one chooses, provided that one’s choice meets 
a rationality constraint, and having the power to act otherwise than one does in the sense that 
one is subject to no duress from any agent, animate or inanimate, forcing one to do what one 
chooses to do. Hence, even if we think that there is a sense in which Oedipus must do what 
he does—on the grounds that Sophocles, like Aristotle, thinks that what will happen must 
happen, and because it is true in advance, and Apollo knows, that Oedipus will (literally) kill 
his father and marry his mother (or both)—these facts still do not derogate from Oedipus’ 
(real) freedom. If Oedipus must do what he does in a metaphysical sense, then that, as we 
have said, is no more than the reflection of an ex post facto inference from the factual to the 
necessary. It matters, for freedom, how this necessity comes about: if it comes about merely 
66 
 
because that is what Oedipus will choose to do, there is no conflict with freedom, because his 
actions may still be performed freely in the socio-political sense. The future will be that 
particular way—and so must be that way, if we accept the modal inference—because 
Oedipus will freely perform such and such actions. By contrast, he would not be free if he 
acted under duress. But acting within the causal order—this was one of Hume’s great 
insights—does not as such put agents under duress: causes do not enforce their effects; they 
merely precede them in a lawlike manner. Force, duress, compulsion, constraint, to the extent 
that these things deprive one of freedom, necessarily involve human or non-human agency; 
they are not, just as such, what causes do to effects. 
 
The same goes for predictions: predictions do not enforce the predicted outcomes. Hence, 
even if we think that Oedipus acts under a kind of temporal necessity, because he cannot 
change the past and Apollo’s prediction is assumed to be both infallible and determinate in 
meaning, so that by dint of the transfer of necessity principle Oedipus must now do what he 
was predicted to do, still he is free in the genuine sense of the word, and it was only because 
Apollo foresaw what Oedipus would freely (in the genuine sense) do that he was able to 
make the prediction in the first place.
200
 Apollo does not exercise any kind of duress on 
Oedipus; he does not actively bring about Oedipus’ fall. As numerous commentators have 
observed, he merely foretells it.
201
 However, the view that Apollo not only foresees but also 
determines Oedipus’ actions and fate persists;202 it is implied in the common statement that 
Oedipus is the ‘plaything’ of the gods.203 Klaus Nickau writes: ‘Der Gott Apollon stellt die 
Aufgabe, der Mensch Ödipus löst sie’ (‘The god Apollo sets the problem, the man Oedipus 
solves it’: 1994, 10). It is true that in the Aeschylean and Euripidean versions of the Laius 
story, Apollo does set a task or problem, since there his prophecy is conditional, so that Laius 
has to decide whether to refrain from having a son, or proceed and take the consequences.
204
 
But in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex Apollo does not figure in that way. And in any case, as we 
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have said, it is plausible that the meaning of Apollo’s oracle is not so fixed that Oedipus 
cannot fulfil it harmlessly. 
 
8 Operatur deus in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem 
I have argued that Oedipus is free in his crucial actions. In fact, even if Sophocles had 
represented Apollo as determining the acts of parricide and incest—even if you think that that 
is how Sophocles does represent things—that would still not detract from Oedipus’ freedom. 
And the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for other tragic heroes. This is so because of a 
fundamental principle governing divine intervention in traditional literature, namely that 
operatur deus in unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem: the god acts in each person 
according to that person’s character.205 Labels such as ‘overdetermination’ (Dodds), or ‘the 
“double determination” of cause’ (Willink), or ‘the unity of two aspects’ (Lesky),206 do not 
accurately register the true nature of the explanatory connection between divine prompting 
and human response. These accounts do not reflect the fact that there is an explanatory 
asymmetry between human and divine planes. The explanatory relation runs from former to 
latter, and not from latter to former: that is, it is the human plane that explains the divine, and 
not vice versa. Lesky criticizes Dodds on the basis that ‘overdetermination’ fails to capture 
the mutual connectedness of divine and human planes (1961, 29–30, 44), but it seems to me 
that he in turn misses the fact that this mutual connectedness is asymmetric—that the human 
plane enjoys explanatory priority, so that in ‘the unity of the two aspects’ the two aspects do 
not contribute equally or independently. This asymmetry is also missed by Jean-Pierre 
Vernant in his discussion of the Heraclitean dictum ‘ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn’.207 This 
aphorism is an identity statement, and identity statements can be read in two different 
directions, with correspondingly different emphases. Is Heraclitus saying ‘You might have 
thought that a human being’s character, ēthos anthrōpōi, was something natural, but actually 
it is daimōn, which is (as we know) supernatural’? Or is he saying, contrariwise, ‘You might 
have thought that daimōn was something supernatural, but actually it is just a human being’s 
character, which is (as we know) natural’? In other words, is he reducing the natural to the 
supernatural or vice versa? The former option seems to me unlikely, since it is the natural that 
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is given, the onus being on the supernatural to earn its metaphysical keep; but, whichever 
way Heraclitus himself intended his aphorism, it is only when it is construed in the latter way 
that it speaks truly about the role of the supernatural in classical and classicizing tragic 
literature. For in this genre it is the natural that is in the driving seat, the supernatural that tags 
along behind. 
 
Lesky discusses (1961, 43–4) the Pandaros episode in Homer’s Iliad (IV, 73–148), in which 
Athene prompts Pandaros to break the truce that has been established between Trojans and 
Greeks. Why does Athene approach Pandaros in particular? She does so because he has the 
right combination of ambition, bravery, greed, and folly to give ear to temptation.
208
 As we 
learn later, Pandaros is keen to prove himself as an archer, having ignored his father’s advice 
to take chariot and horses to Troy (V, 180–216). Similarly, Virgil’s Allecto appears to Turnus 
in order to rouse him to violence against the Trojan interlopers precisely because he is the 
kind of man who will listen to her.
209
 He initially spurns her approaches, then knuckles under; 
we have a representation of Turnus’ inherent violence overcoming temporary resistance, as 
also in Seneca’s Thyestes when Tantalus succumbs to the Fury.210 When, in the same play, 
Atreus devises his revenge he repeats the word ‘rapior’ (261–2)—‘I am snatched away, borne 
along’—but ‘his vagueness about the force that is possessing him is appropriate, since it 
ultimately proceeds from within him’.211 Downing’s comment on Lord Monchensey in T. S. 
Eliot’s The Family Reunion (1969, 346)— 
We most of us seem to live according to circumstance, 
But with people like him, there’s something inside them 
That accounts for what happens to them— 
encapsulates the fate of almost all tragic heroes and heroines. Aristotle has often been 
criticized for marginalizing the role of the supernatural in his discussion of tragedy in the 
Poetics, but in one good sense he was right: it is the natural that does all the work.
212
 Stephen 
Halliwell’s view is that Aristotle omits the gods because their involvement in tragedy is, from 
a human point of view, fortuitous (governed by tuchē), so that mentioning them would upset 
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his emphasis on probability and necessity in tragedy.
213
 On my approach, he incurs praise 
rather than blame: Aristotle omits the gods because he thinks that the supernatural is, in the 
deep structure of tragedy, irrelevant, and he is right about that. ‘Supernatural’ causation is, au 
fond, natural. As Darius puts it in Aeschylus’ Persae, ‘when a man is in a hurry himself, the 
god will lend him a hand’ (742; tr. Sommerstein): that captures the ex post facto status of 
divine motivation of human action.
214
 Likewise, too, with the positive version of the same 
idea: God helps those who help themselves.
215
 In the messenger speech of the Persae, and in 
the words of its main agents, the idea of divine causation is repeatedly invoked,
216
 but the 
narrated and portrayed events are nevertheless given purely naturalistic explanations, and it is 





The point of divine intervention in traditional literature is not to undermine the autonomy and 
sufficiency of human motivation but to represent it in a particular way—in fact to enlarge and 
dignify it,
218
 rather in the manner of the sublime moment in Bellini’s Norma when the 
heroine senses the presence of the druid god Irminsul (II, 7): 
A mirare il trionfo de’ figli 
ecco il Dio sovra un raggio di sol, 
s’un raggio di sol. 
(‘See the god marvelling at his sons’ triumph, upon a ray of sunshine’: 2013, 160.) But 
Irminsul takes no part in the action, which is motivated entirely naturalistically. What the 
divine says to the mortal, the mortal has already said, or is about to say, to itself. From 
Marlowe to Calderón to Goethe to Berlioz to Gounod to Busoni to Mann the devil appears to 
Faust because he is primed, or has even expressly abjured heaven and adjured hell, as in 
Marlowe’s version. It is true that Marlowe’s Mephostophilis arrogates the initiative to 
himself (B-text: V, 2, 96–9):  
’Twas I that, when thou wert i’ the way to heaven, 
Damned up thy passage. When thou took’st the book 
To view the Scriptures, then I turned the leaves  
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And led thine eye. 
Mark Burnett thinks that these lines communicate the author’s view that Faustus ‘is damned 
all along: he has no freedom of choice’ (2010, 172). But they are part of Mephistophilis’ 
characterization, and what they convey is just bravado: Faustus is from first to last 
responsible and free, and the contest between the good and bad angels merely gives external 
expression to a debate that is going on in Faustus’s soul.219 Like Faustus, Milton’s Eve is 
ready to listen to Satan’s temptations: there is a sense in which she has already fallen.220 
 
The psychologizing of Aphrodite’s role in Euripides’ Hippolytus is rendered easy by the fact 
that she speaks the prologue and then takes no further part in the drama: she seems to sink 
into the action as a psychic force,
221
 which is the way that the Nurse characterizes her (443–
50).
222
 (Similar remarks apply to the roles of Cupid and Megaera in The Tragedy of Tancred 
and Gismund by Robert Wilmot and others.) In this respect she contrasts with Dionysus in 
the Bacchae, who speaks a similar prologue to Aphrodite’s in the Hippolytus, but then does 
take part in the play, in human form.
223
 But this difference, though dramatically important, is 
from our point of view theoretically superficial: it does not signal a deep difference in the 
extent to which the supernatural can be naturalized. As Dodds remarks in his commentary on 
the Bacchae: ‘In the maddening of Pentheus, as in the maddening of Heracles . . ., the poet 
shows us the supernatural attacking the victim’s personality at its weakest point—working 
upon and through nature, not against it. The god wins because he has an ally in the enemy’s 
camp: the persecutor is betrayed by what he would persecute—the Dionysiac longing in 
himself’.224 In the Helen, the contest between Hera and Aphrodite has to be resolved on the 
day of action, but the prophetess Theonoe makes clear that the decision between them is a 
matter of whether she decides to tell Theoclymenos of Menelaus’ presence in Egypt, so that 
the divine level is in effect anthropomorphized.
225
 Athene drives Sophocles’ Ajax mad, but 
the madness is readily naturalizable when we recall that it supervened on Ajax’ decision, 
which he never later regrets, to launch a treacherous attack on the Greek leaders. Ajax’ 
madness emerges organically from his character and dispositions, in the context of the slight 
he has received and his impulse to avenge it: ‘the seeds of madness were already in him, 
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evidenced by an abnormal megalomaniac pride’.226 As Gisbert Ter-Nedden notes (2007, 345–
6), Athene’s apparent inducing of Ajax’ madness is just a dramatic device to represent his 
Verblendung, which Athene does not induce, but rather reveals. Athene remarks to Odysseus: 
‘Do you see, Odysseus, how great is the power of the gods? What man was found to be more 
farsighted than this one, or better at doing what the occasion required?’ (118–20; tr. Lloyd-
Jones). The play—and indeed the tradition more generally—show these assessments of Ajax’ 
character to be wrong,
227
 which suggests a debunking reading of the ‘power of the gods’ too. 
What we really see in the Ajax is not the power of the gods, but the power of human nature: 
this is demonstrated in spectacular fashion when Athene fails in her attempts to make 
Odysseus triumph over Ajax and Ajax sympathize with Odysseus (79, 111). 
 
Before his single combat with Paris, Homer’s Menelaus prays to Zeus for aid, and he asks the 
god to ‘subdue him beneath my hands’ (Iliad III, 352). If Menelaus had killed Paris, he would 
have thanked Zeus for answering his prayer, but would have taken credit for victory no whit 
the less.
228
 As Garvie remarks concerning the divine aid to the Athenians in Aeschylus’ 
Persae (342), the audience would not feel that this help detracted from their achievement: 
‘they would remember the Iliad, in which divine support did not normally diminish the glory 
which a hero earned by his exploits; if anything, it enhanced it by showing that he was heroic 
enough to deserve that support’.229 Conversely, when humans blame gods for their actions, 
they do not think that this lessens their own responsibility, as we learn from the case of 
Agamemnon’s apology in Iliad XIX.230 Some commentators take Agamemnon’s words at 
face value,
231
 but the sense at 137–8, filling out the subtext, is ‘But since I was blinded by atē 
and Zeus robbed me of my wits <I am therefore to blame, and so> I wish to make amends 
and to give abundant recompense’. (Earlier—XIX, 86–90—Agamemnon had apparently 
denied responsibility and placed it on the gods: but there he is fudging the issue and trying to 
save face.)
232
 And, in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, the fact that in sacrificing his daughter he is 
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carrying out the will of Zeus does not absolve Agamemnon from responsibility.
233
 Ancient 
defendants were indeed ill-advised to plead divine instigation of their actions, for any such 
supernatural intervention would naturally be construed as a sign of voluntariness and so of 
guilt.
234
 A similar point applies to apparent intrusions on the agent’s autonomy that might 
otherwise be regarded as diminishing responsibility: if another mortal makes me commit a 
crime, I may be able to plead duress in extenuation of the offence;
235
 but if a god ‘makes’ me 
do it, that renders me all the more responsible for it. The chorus of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon 
remarks that Cassandra goes to her death like a beast approaching the altar ‘driven by a god’ 
(1297–8), that is to say, voluntarily. For it was important in sacrifices that the beast should 
not have to be forced—that is, not forced by the priests. If it is forced ‘by a god’, then it is not 
forced at all.
236
 Dodds suggested that, whereas for Plato’s priest, speaking on behalf of 
Lachesis in the Myth of Er, ‘the responsibility is the chooser’s; the god is exempt from 
responsibility (theos anaitios)’ (Republic 617e4–5), Aeschylus might have preferred ‘the 
responsibility is the chooser’s; the god is responsible for everything (theos panaitios)’ (1973, 
56–7). But the two formulations are equivalent. 
 
In Matthew Arnold’s ‘Sohrab and Rustum’, which inverts the motif of the son slaying the 
father, Sohrab blames fate for his death (708–15). But Sohrab’s death is quite clearly the 
outcome of human decisions and human mistakes. Its fatefulness does not undermine that 
human causality, but is a way of representing it, of celebrating it, of coming to terms with it. 
Even in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, where the fairies’ interventions in the human action 
might seem essential to the resolution of the love plot, Shakespeare implies a naturalistic 
construal of events. ‘The spell is never taken off Demetrius’ eyes; without its lasting effect 
the love-tangle could not be resolved’, comments Harold Brooks (on III, 2, 452). Well, but 
recall Helena’s words (I, 1, 242–3): 
 For ere Demetrius looked on Hermia’s eyne, 
 He hailed down oaths that he was only mine. 
Perhaps Oberon’s lasting spell on Demetrius can be regarded naturalistically as the removal 
of an obsession for Hermia that had artificially interfered with his true love for Helena.
237
 In 
that case, though in a relatively superficial sense ‘in the Dream, the mortals are unaware how 
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far they are puppets of the gods, and they never realize how their own sight has been 
tampered with’,238 at a deeper level we have human autonomy. Sophocles’ Oedipus says 
‘These things were Apollo’, but he adds ‘None but I struck myself’ (1329–32).239 (Creon in 
the Antigone expresses himself similarly.)
240
 Oedipus is not making a distinction between 
those events for which Apollo was responsible, and a distinct set of events for which he was 
responsible.
241
 He takes responsibility for everything: in invoking Apollo, Oedipus elevates, 
without disavowing, his own part in his demise. There was nothing untypically free about 
Oedipus’ self-blinding: the freedom that he exercised when he performed that desperate act 
was one that had attached to all his actions. Again, when Oedipus says (at 1382–3) that the 
gods have disclosed his guilt, he immediately adds (1384–5) that he has done so himself. 
 
It is true that, once gods are on the scene, storytellers can represent them as full and 
independent agents, doing things that have no immediate or straightforward allegorical 
reduct:
242
 an artist may even take a secular tale and inject a pantheon into it, as Wagner 
(borrowing from Norse legend) did with the Nibelungenlied. Above we contrasted Euripides’ 
Aphrodite and his Dionysus, after they have spoken their prologues: the former takes no part 
in the main action of the Hippolytus, whereas the latter plays a decisive role in the main 
action of the Bacchae. Or consider the appearance of the Furies in the Eumenides. They first 
appear to the mad Orestes at the end of the Choephori, but not to the chorus, and in that 
manifestation they can be readily and immediately psychologized; but they then appear to the 
Pythia at the beginning of the Eumenides, so must have objective reality, and in the third part 
of the trilogy they emerge as autonomous agents, and continue to be such after Orestes has 
recovered sanity and been purified of blood-guilt and acquitted by the Areopagite court.
243
 
Similarly, although the Furies in Seneca’s Agamemnon (359–64) and Medea (958–65) have 
no objective reality, a Fury appears as a stage figure in the prologue to the Thyestes.
244
 In 
Sophocles’ Ajax Athene’s role in driving Ajax mad can be straightforwardly psychologized, 
as we have said, but in her exchanges with Odysseus and Ajax she figures as an independent 
agent, no matter how we settle the controversial question of the extent of her visibility to 
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 Again, as Dodds implied in a passage cited above, the role of 
Euripides’ Iris and Lyssa in driving Heracles mad can be psychologized in an obvious way: 
the strain of Heracles’ labours, and particularly of the last one, the harrowing of hell, has 
turned his wits, so that he has become a serial murderer, and thinks of the killing of his own 
children as his thirteenth labour; Heracles is a man of violence who needs violent tasks to 
occupy him;
246
 against some critics,
247
 I believe that Wilamowitz was right to discern signs of 
incipient madness in Heracles before Iris and Lyssa enter.
248
 But Hera’s two lackeys are 
hardly on stage before they quarrel, since Lyssa, who is the apotheosis of madness, 
paradoxically does not want to madden Heracles. So Iris and Lyssa, though to a large extent 
psychologizable, are also put on stage by the playwright as independent agents. It follows 
that we need to adopt a split-level approach to naturalizing the divine in traditional literature: 
some uses of the supernatural are immediately psychologizable; others are not. But it makes 
sense to treat the former as primary, or basic, and the latter as secondary, or derived, 
deployments of the supernatural. In the first instance, we might say, the divine in traditional 
literature does no more than body forth the human in a way that is immediately reducible to 
human psychology. But once divine agents on the scene, they can be given a life of their own, 
and can interact with mortal agents in a way which has no immediate allegorical reduct, only 
a mediate one.  
 
Again, once divine agents are on the scene, the whole question of their relation to mortal 
affairs can be raised. Thus Euripides sometimes permits his characters to discuss explicitly 
the role of the gods and whether it undermines human freedom: in the Heracles, Theseus and 
Heracles debate this matter at length; Heracles’ famously rationalistic response to Theseus’ 
naïve belief in the tales of the poets stands in contradiction with his own sense of himself as a 
victim of Hera.
249
 In the Orestes, Helen seeks to excuse herself as the victim of a ‘god-sent 
madness’ (79), and in the Trojan Women, the question whether Helen acted freely in 
deserting Menelaus or was driven by Aphrodite becomes part of the central debate between 
her and Hecuba, so that here again Euripides is allowing himself to play with the issue of the 
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connection between divine intervention and human freedom.
250
 In the Aeneid, Nisus raises 
the same question: ‘Are the gods responsible for the ardour that I feel, or do we make gods of 
our desires?’ (IX, 184–5). The answer is the latter, but once the gods physically interfere as 
agents in the action more thoughtful characters will inevitably pose Nisus’ question. Even so, 
as I have suggested, the relative independence of divine agents, if that literary gambit is 
present, though it may block an immediate psychologizing move, does not derogate from the 
fundamental legitimacy of the naturalistic strategy, seeing that the relative independence of 
the divine is a derived status. And poets can work at both primary and secondary levels, as 
we have seen. Virgil’s Allecto has an easy time of it turning Amata against Aeneas, but she 
encounters resistance when she visits Turnus, even though she has been careful to present a 
persuasive appearance by disguising herself as a priestess (VII, 435–44). But the fact that 
Turnus, unlike Amata, initially rebuffs Allecto no more detracts from Allecto’s essentially 
allegorical status than the fact that Palinurus, Aeneas’ helmsman, initially resists Sleep (also 
in disguise) detracts from the latter’s similar status (V, 847–53).251 (The vigour of Turnus’ 
response to Allecto suggests in any case that her words have hit home.)
252
 Tellingly, in his 
1614 tragedy Turne Jean Prévost entirely omitted the part of Allecto. And Lucan had already 
dispensed with the gods. It remains the case, then, that divine interactions with human beings 
have the asymmetric structure I have identified. Divine action in traditional literature is—
immediately or mediately—parasitic on, and deeply driven by, facts of human psychology. 
 
Aeschylus’ Clytemnestra provides an interesting case in this connection. Initially, 
Clytemnestra is happy to take responsibility for her husband’s murder, indeed glories in her 
deed, and defends her action to the chorus as though it were entirely her responsibility (1372–
1447). But when the chorus responds (1470) that the spirit of the house is wielding power 
through women, and that Zeus is responsible for everything (1486), Clytemnestra seizes the 
opportunity to urge that an avenging spirit committed the murder in her person (1501). The 
chorus rejects this pretext and affirms that Clytemnestra did the deed (1505–6), but then 
concedes that an avenging spirit might have been an accessory (1508). In his commentary 
Eduard Fraenkel says that Clytemnestra ‘is not making excuses for herself’ (1978, vol. 3, 
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711); but that is exactly what she is doing, though in due course (1551–3) she drops the 
strategy and reverts to her initial acknowledgement that she killed Agamemnon.
253
 I suggest 
that the back-and-forth movement illustrates the essential identity of natural and supernatural 
glosses on Clytemnestra’s action, which has the effect of giving priority to the natural. She 
tries to shift the blame for her deed onto the daimōn of the house, but, though it was the 
chorus that first suggested the excuse, it now disallows the move:
254
 even if an avenging spirit 
is an accessory, that does not absolve Clytemnestra from guilt. Despite overt mention of an 
ancestral curse, Aeschylus’ agents are still free and incur their guilt freely,255 in the Oresteia 
no less than in Eugene O’Neill’s powerful adaptation of it, transposed from the Greek heroic 
age to the immediate aftermath of the American Civil War, Mourning Becomes Electra. 
Garvie writes that ‘In Aeschylus it seems that the son who inherits the family curse is never 
an innocent sufferer. He inherits not just guilt but a propensity to incur fresh guilt himself, 
and he is thus always in some degree responsible for his suffering’.256 The point applies to 
Clytemnestra too.
257
 Attempts to blame the gods in Attic tragedy are indeed generally 
implausible. Aeschylus’ Eteocles, like his Clytemnestra, tries to transfer responsibility for his 
actions to the divine (Seven Against Thebes, 689–91); but the chorus insists that it is his own 
fatal desire that prompts him to meet his brother in single combat (692–4).258 The excuse fails 
from Homer, whose Zeus roundly rejects the stratagem, to Garnier’s Cleopatre, who likewise 
dismisses the theological excuse that Charmion offers her, to Hughes’s Mordred, who blames 
fate but is aware of his own guilt, to Goethe’s Egmont, who likewise inveighs against his 
Schicksal but admits that he freely ignored the warnings he received, to Thomas Hardy’s 
Napoléon, who pretends to be ‘Ruled by the pitiless Planet of Destiny’ in a world that is 
clearly governed by human decisions; recall too the epiphenomenal close of Tess of the 
D’Ubervilles.259 
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In Sophocles’ Ajax it is reported by the messenger that Ajax once boasted that even a nobody 
could be successful with the help of the gods, but that he believed he could win glory without 
them (766–9). The phrase ‘without them’ (δίχα κείνων) is remarkable, as Patrick Finglass 
notes (ad loc.), because of the absence of a negative: ‘great feats are typically achieved “not 
without the help of the gods” ’.260 Ajax’ boast is unheroic, and it puts him in the same camp 
as notorious blasphemers like the Locrian Ajax (Odyssey IV, 504) and Capaneus (Seven 
Against Thebes 427–8).261 One may reconstruct the theoretical background of Ajax’ boast as 
follows. The presence or absence of divine help is initially a matter of success or failure: if 
one succeeds one infers that one had divine help, and not if not.
262
 So here the operatur 
principle is fully functional: the divine shadows the human. But once that idea is in place, it is 
natural to pray to the gods for their assistance in advance, so as to ensure success. By the 
same token, it might be thought risky not to do so, and then by a further step the boastful and 
the blasphemous can claim that ‘even without divine aid . . .’. So this looks like another case 
where the operatur principle provides theoretical underpinning, but, once a divine apparatus 
is in place, it takes on a life of its own. This structure enables us to solve a puzzle noted by A. 
L. Brown (1983, 33): the Olympian gods are depicted as enjoying private lives as 
independent agents, but when they intervene in human affairs they are restricted to ‘bringing 
about’ events that could have happened anyway through natural causes. Why? The answer 
lies in the asymmetry I have been stressing. The gods are so restricted because their primary 
or basic function is to ennoble the natural, not to change or undermine it. Once they have 
been posited, a secondary or derived level comes into existence at which the gods can be 
portrayed as superhuman agents with private, independent lives, but the fact that their powers 
of intervention in mortal affairs remain severely limited betrays their naturalistic aetiology. 
 
A similar point applies to allegorical abstractions. In his Life of Milton Dr Johnson famously 
observed that ‘such airy beings are, for the most part, suffered only to do their natural office; 
and retire. Thus Fame tells a tale, and Victory hovers over a general, or perches on a 
standard; but Fame and Victory can do no more’ (1958–77, vol. 21, 198). So, for example, 
when the reckless Segramors attacks Parzifal, the latter is held in distraction by Lady Love 
(vrou Minne). Fortunately his steed is alert to the danger and its movements bring Parzifal to 
his senses—or, as Wolfram von Eschenbach puts it, Lady Reason (vrou Witze) brings him to 
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his senses (Parzifal 288, 3–14). Johnson goes on just after the passage quoted to censure 
those poets who give ‘airy beings’ more to do than perform their natural office: ‘In the 
Prometheus of Aeschylus, we see Violence and Strength, and in the Alcestis of Euripides, we 
see Death brought upon the stage, all as active persons of the drama; but no precedents can 
justify absurdity’ (ibid.). Absurd or not, the important point for our purposes is that these 
developments have the articulated, split-level structure I have identified: in its conceptually 
original manifestation, Death can do no more than perform its natural office, but once it is 
brought on stage as a character, it can be given more to do. When, in Tasso’s Gerusalemme 
Liberata, Erminia steals Clorinda’s armour and secretly leaves Jerusalem to find Tancred, 
Love invigorates her failing spirits and flagging limbs, but also laughs at the ridiculous figure 
she cuts in her masculine attire (VI, 92–3). In his classic work The Allegory of Love, C. S. 
Lewis skilfully traced the process of abstraction that underlay the trend to allegory in late 
classical and medieval literature. What does not emerge from Lewis’s discussion with 
sufficient clarity, however, is that the process of abstraction is in some respects a reversion to 
type: the ‘allegorization of the pantheon’ (2013a, 73), by virtue of which, for example, Mars 
becomes a mere symbol of war (no love affairs with Venus), is in fact a rediscovery of the 
gods’ original function and point. The gods, Lewis tells us, ‘sink into personifications’ (ibid., 
78–9); but that is what they always really were. 
 
To obviate possible misunderstanding, I need to make clear that I am not suggesting that the 
naturalizing and debunking thoughts that I have been exploring in this section in connection 
with the operatur principle were actually entertained as a matter of course by ordinary people 
in antiquity or the medieval period. The moves were certainly available, and they were 
entertained by some, relatively enlightened thinkers (I shall return to this point, §20), but one 
presumes that for the vast majority of people divinity was, in Ruth Padel’s words, ‘part of the 
fabric of the world and the self’ and that for them, as Thales said, ‘all things are full of gods’ 
(1992, 48). Again, it may be true to say, as Blair Hoxby does, that ‘the early moderns, unlike 
most of us today, experienced their selves not as bounded egos but as voids open to spiritual 
influences’.263 In fact I think that this—and certainly ‘voids’—goes too far (I shall return to 
this issue in Chapter 4); but I am not denying that, until relatively recently, for most people 
the ordinary world was felt to be interpenetrated by an extraordinary, spiritual world with its 
own distinctive ontology and dynamics. The question in this section has concerned the extent 
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to which that ontology and those dynamics are—and are portrayed in tragic literature as 
being—independent of the natural, and in particular independent of natural human 
motivation. My contention has been that, at the primary or basic level, there is no such 
independence, and indeed that the supernatural is dependent on the natural. Only at a 
secondary or derived level does space arise—assuming that a divine apparatus, generated at 
the basic level, is in place—for a certain measure of divine autonomy. This is a theoretical 
point. In effect what I have been offering is a genealogy of the role of gods in traditional 
literature, in the sense in which Hume and Nietzsche offered genealogies of morality.
264
 The 
story reconstructs a derivation of the phenomena in a way that is intended to make sense of 
them and display their underlying rationale. It would not falsify Hume’s genealogy of justice, 
for example, if it were found to be historically inaccurate: Hume is not trying to reconstruct 
actual historical events. In the same way, my account here is meant to be a philosophical 
heuristic rather than a genetic ‘just so’ story. 
 
It does not follow from what I have said that, if you ‘strip [Macbeth] of a supernatural 
stranglehold, placing responsibility for the evildoing entirely on the ambitious couple’, you 
are thereby forced into ‘seeing it as compensatory for some personal loss or trauma’.265 That 
would be too modern an inference, requiring us to find that every wrongdoer is at some 
deeper level a victim. In Aristotelo-Bradleian fashion the Macbeths’ characters give rise to 
their actions—they are responsible for their deeds—but the play does not invite us to ask how 
they got their characters in the first place. There is nothing to suggest deviance from the 
traditional, Aristotelian view that we are responsible for our characters. Recall the dictum of 
Plato’s priest that ‘the responsibility is the chooser’s; the god is exempt from responsibility’ 
(Republic 617e4–5). If we read the Myth of Er as part of Plato’s anti-tragic polemic, then we 
arrive at a ‘Platonic contrast between two ultimate hypotheses about the world—the first that 
human lives are governed by external forces which are indifferent to, and capable of 
crushing, the quest for happiness; the second that the source of true happiness is located 
nowhere other than in the individual soul’s choice between good and evil’.266 My point here 
has been that the first of these hypotheses is liable to send us down a wrong path, towards a 
misunderstanding of tragedy; if I am right, we have the basis of a response to Plato. Tragedy 
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is about individual responsibility, and the involvement of gods in no way undermines that. It 
is not the case that tragedy shows how ‘destiny is ultimately beyond human control’.267  
 
Schelling argued that tragedy depicts a clash of necessity and freedom, that human freedom 
consists in struggling against a superior destiny, and that Aristotle was wrong to try to 
substitute hamartia for the will of destiny in the aetiology of tragic guilt.
268
 In his essay ‘Über 
die tragische Kunst’, Schiller propounded the more radical view that ancient tragic heroes 
were trapped in a causal order that robbed them of freedom, whereas modern such heroes 
manage to transcend the causal order.
269
 Schelling’s position influenced A. W. Schlegel and 
Coleridge, who in his lectures on Shakespeare held that tragedies involve ‘those Struggles of 
inward Free Will with outward Necessity’, and was embraced more recently by Raymond 
Williams.
270
 Schelling and Schiller were themselves influenced by the Kantian antinomy 
between freedom and nature, not to mention the effects, as it developed from aspiration and 
hope to tyranny and terror, of the French Revolution.
271
 And the essential view had already 
been formulated by Goethe in his 1771 Rede zum Shakespears Tag.
272
 If my argument in this 
chapter has been sound, these assertions, and in particular the claim that there is an 
opposition between freedom and necessity in ancient tragic literature, are unsustainable. As 
Schmitt observes, ancient tragic heroes are both free and part of the natural order.
273
 Indeed 
modern heroes are too—how could they not be? Schiller’s exemplary modern heroes are 
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, Corneille’s Rodrigue and Chimène, and Wieland’s Hüon and 
Amanda;
274
 but when one examines the precise ways in which Shakespeare, Corneille, and 
Wieland characterize them one finds that, though these figures defy the stars, they do not 
escape from the causal order. That would, after all, be a rather difficult thing to do: you 
cannot do it merely by railing against the world, as Lear found when the thunder would not 
peace at his bidding. 
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There is a fascinating passage in Werner Heisenberg’s autobiography in which he describes 
how he conversed with a friend as they picked their way through the ruins of Berlin after an 
air-raid in March 1943. (Here one cannot help but recall T. S. Eliot’s conversation, in similar 
circumstances, with the ghost of his former self in the central panel of ‘Little Gidding’.) In 
that discussion Heisenberg diagnoses the nisus we have identified in Schelling and Schiller—
the thought that freedom can only consist in escape from the causal order—as a peculiarly 
German tendency of thought.
275
 One suspects that it is a good deal more widespread. But it is 
certainly associated with German tragedy, and not just by German critics. In his splendid 
biography of Lessing, H. B. Nisbet writes that ‘In Goethe’s Götz von Berlichingen, Schiller’s 
Wallenstein, Büchner’s Danton’s Death and most major tragedies of the nineteenth century, 
there is much more emphasis on the destructive power of impersonal external forces than in 
Lessing’s dramatic theory and practice, where individual character and tensions within 
smaller human groups remain central’ (2013, 405). This rather strongly implies that Götz, 
Wallenstein, and Danton struggle, in their respective plays, against superior forces—that they 
undergo Schicksalstragödien. But it seems to me clear that all three heroes fully conform to 
the Aristotelian pattern I have identified, in which hamartiai, consisting of culpable cognitive 
failures, are punished home. Wallenstein is plainly subject to what Bernhard Greiner calls his 
‘enormous self-delusion’ (2012, 439). Götz indeed thinks he is struck down by the gods,276 
but the play of which he is the hero makes clear that the vital decisions are in his hands and 
that he commits crucial errors: he misjudges Weislingen, and he foolishly joins the peasant 
rebellion, the excesses of which he then—predictably—cannot control. Büchner’s play 
resembles the Oedipus Rex inasmuch as Danton’s crimes lie in the past (‘durch alle Gassen 
schrie und zetert es: September!’, a reference to the September massacres in which Danton 
had had a hand),
277
 and it resembles the fifth act of Macbeth both in this respect and in its 
mood of world-weariness; Danton must now pay the price for his past felonies. It is a pity 
that Nisbet does not mention which other major tragedies he has in mind, but the three that he 
does mention fully fit the Aristotelian model, as do Sophocles’ Women of Trachis, 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, and Voltaire’s Tancrède, which Schopenhauer listed (along 
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Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex does not tell us what would have happened if Apollo’s oracle had 
been silent: would Oedipus even so have killed Laius and married Jocasta? We do not know, 
but presumably one possibility is that he would not (recall the discussion of Cavell above, 
§7), and in that case one might say that, though (as I have argued) Apollo did not make 
Oedipus perform those actions, he did do something which was such that, had he not done it, 
Oedipus would not have performed them, so that, even if we do not have the sort of causation 
that destroys freedom, namely duress, still we have counterfactual dependence. Even if we 
say, with Kovacs (2009, 361), that Oedipus ‘has been deliberately set up’ by Apollo, still, 
agents who are (merely) ‘set up’ perform their actions freely: if I insult you intending that 
you lash out at me so that I can then threaten you with legal action, assuming the ruse is 
successful you might feel that you had been ‘set up’, but you could not deny that you had 
assaulted me freely. In a similar way, the youths of Chaucer’s Pardoner’s Tale would not 
have met their grim end had they not encountered Death and acted on his words, so that we 
have counterfactual dependence, and Death indeed ‘sets them up’, but their actions in the 
story are from first to last free. In the Nibelungenlied, the Meerfrauen tell Hagen that no one 
will survive the visit to Etzel and Kriemhild except the chaplain. Hagen tries to falsify the 
prediction by drowning the chaplain at the crossing of the Rhine, but the chaplain manages to 
escape to the hither bank, and so does not take part in the fatal expedition:
279
 Hagen’s very 
attempt to falsify it contributes to ensuring the prediction’s truth. Again, we read in the 
Holinshed chronicles on which Macbeth was based that King Natholocus sent a gentleman to 
consult a witch about a revolt which was being fomented against his rule.
280
 The witch tells 
the gentleman that the king will be murdered by a close and trustworthy friend, in fact by that 
gentleman himself. He then reviles her for her villainous prophecy, but on his return journey 
he realizes that if he repeats her words to the king, or if they are divulged by another, his life 
will be imperilled, for Natholocus will have good reason to put him out of the way. 
Whereupon he resolves to strike first, and on his arrival at court he kills the king. Here too we 
have counterfactual dependence, but also full freedom. (The gentleman is an early victim of 
the ‘Hobbesian trap’.)281 The same holds of the witches’ prophecies to Macbeth in 
Shakespeare’s play: he would not have acted as he did if he had not heard their prediction 
that he would be king, but his actions are those of a free agent. 
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Though I disagreed with the view conveyed in the quotation from Nickau given above (§7), it 
is interesting to note how it echoes the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Die 
Tatsachen gehören alle nur zur Aufgabe, nicht zur Lösung’ (‘The facts all belong only to the 
task set, not to its solution’: §6.4321). By ‘solution’ Wittgenstein means, as he goes on to tell 
us, ‘the solution to the problem of life’, and for the Wittgenstein of the Notebooks and the 
Tractatus that solution resides in taking up a certain attitude to the facts, which in a 
transcendental sense we cannot affect. For Sophocles, the relevant sense in which the facts 
obtain is not a transcendental but an empirical one, and as I have stressed Oedipus certainly 
can affect—settle, determine—the facts. He cannot change the facts; but then no one can 
change the facts, if by that phrase we mean, supposing that it is the case that p, having the 
power to bring it about that not-p as well. No one can do that; but having the power, given 
that p, to bring it about that not-p instead, is by contrast unproblematic (at least in many 
cases), and Oedipus, like any free agent, has that power. (If it is a fact that p, then it follows 
that I do not exercise any power I might have to bring about not-p instead, but it does not 
follow that I do not have that power; if I had exercised it, then it would not have been a fact 
that p.) But there is also a sense in which Sophocles’ play is about the proper reaction to the 
facts as they are. Oedipus responds to his catastrophe by a wilful act of self-blinding; but 
there were other options. He might have left Thebes and succeeded Polybus at Corinth. It 
might even have been possible for Oedipus to continue to rule Thebes, as in the Homeric and 
Euripidean versions of the story (it is presupposed in the Oedipus at Colonus that he 
remained in Thebes after the revelations),
282
 though during the course of the play Oedipus 




The parallel with Jocasta is instructive here. Oedipus drives her to suicide, in effect, but it is 
by no means clear from the play that she could not have lived with knowledge of the truth if 
it had been kept sufficiently submerged. It is a nice question when exactly Jocasta gains 
understanding. Lefèvre thinks that she is just as obtuse as Oedipus (2001, 142), but she 
evidently grasps the truth more quickly than he does. When Oedipus learns that Polybus has 
died a natural death, so, apparently, falsifying the oracle, Jocasta tries to stop the 
investigation (973–83; tr. Lloyd-Jones): 
 JOCASTA 
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       Did I not foretell this to you long ago? 
 OEDIPUS 
       You told me: but I was led along by fear. 
 JOCASTA 
       Then let none of these things worry you any more!  
 OEDIPUS 
        And how can I not fear intercourse with my mother? 
 JOCASTA 
But what should a man be afraid of when for him it is the event that rules, and 
there is no certain foreknowledge of anything? It is best to live anyhow, as one 
may; do not be afraid of marriage with your mother! Many have lain with their 
mothers in dreams too. It is he to whom such things are nothing who puts up with 
life the best.  
It is plausible that Jocasta’s line ‘Then let none of these things worry you any more!’ (μὴ νῦν 
ἔτ᾽ αὐτῶν μηδὲν ἐς θυμὸν βάλης), and especially her use of the vague phrase ‘none of these 
things’ (αὐτῶν μηδέν), indicates that she knows the truth. Dawe merely remarks (on 976) that 
‘Jocasta had inadvertently half opened the door to Oedipus’ apprehensive question by using 
the phrase “αὐτῶν μηδέν” instead of “τοῦτο μή” ’—which latter phrase would in context 
mean: ‘Do not let this particular thing (the thought about parricide) worry you’. But the point 
is subtler than that: Jocasta is trying to close down further inquiry into the possibility of incest 
by saying in effect ‘The parricide part of the prediction has turned out to be wrong, so forget 
all of it (including the incest)’. But in order to put the idea of incest out of Oedipus’ mind she 
first has to mention it, and then it sticks. She tries to refer to it as obliquely as possible, hence 
the deliberate vagueness of her phraseology, but the tactic fails. Once you have mentioned 
something, however obliquely, you have mentioned it. (And ‘in dreams too’ looks like a 
Freudian slip—that is, ‘in dreams as well as in waking life’.)284 Plausibly, indeed, Jocasta 
already knows the facts at an earlier stage, namely when she hears Oedipus’ account of his 
background (771–833), for that makes the truth obvious (though not to Oedipus). And the 
clear irrationality of her response to his account (848–58) seems to betray an urgent impulse 
to divert Oedipus from what she already knows to be the reality of the situation.
285
 At any 
rate, D. W. Lucas’s suggestion that ‘Jocasta realizes that Oedipus is her son between 1026 
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and 1056’ (1972, 131) puts the discovery much too late. (In a natural development of 
Sophocles, Gide’s Jocaste knows the truth from the start: 2007, 206–11.) 
 
In the marvellous opening panel of the fourth epeisodion (911–23), Jocasta ‘provides a royal 
and private counterpart to the public acts of piety at the opening of the play, 3–4’, as Dawe 
remarks (on 912–13). She steps forward bearing wreathed branches, and in a poignant and 
desperate appeal begs clemency of Apollo. Oedipus, Jocasta complains, ‘does not judge the 
present in the light of the past as a man of sense would do’ (915–16): that is, he does judge 
the present in the light of the past, but not in the way in which a man of sense would.
286
 A 
man of sense would not let the past impose itself on the present; it is better, as she 
subsequently tells Oedipus in the passage quoted above, ‘to live anyhow, as one may’, 
without delving into things best left hidden; for who does not so live, as the Marschallin 
reminds us in Der Rosenkavalier, will be punished by life and unpitied of God.
287
 The 
atmosphere of Jocasta’s words is thick with a sense of foreboding and failure, rather like 
some classical ekphrases, such as Aeneas’ arrival on the shores of Italy at the beginning of 
the second half of the Aeneid (VII, 25–36),288 or the matrons’ prayer depicted on the mural in 
Virgil’s Carthage (Aeneid I, 479–82), or Clytemnestra’s prayer to Apollo in Sophocles’ 
Electra,
289
 or the locus horridus scene-setting in Seneca’s Thyestes before the description of 
Atreus’ appalling acts (641–82),290 or, again, like the Zwinger scene of Goethe’s Faust 
(1985–99, vol. 7, 156), where Gretchen prays to the Virgin— 
 Ach neige, 
 Du Schmerzenreiche, 
 Dein Antlitz gnädig meiner Not!— 
(‘Oh graciously incline your countenance, you who are rich in pain, to my need!’), or like the 
beginning of the second act of Madam Butterfly (Puccini 1984, 97), where the tragic 
heroine’s maid Suzuki kneels before an image of the Buddha, and implores the gods:  
Fate che Butterfly 
non pianga più, mai più, mai più, mai più! 
(‘Grant that Butterfly may weep no more, no more, no more, no more!’). The words with 
their musical accompaniment insinuate in unambiguous terms that the maid’s intercession 
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will not avail: the more we hear the incantatory repetition of the phrase ‘mai più’, the more 
we sense with absolute certainty that the prayer is falling on deaf ears. Shortly afterwards 
Sharpless arrives with Pinkerton’s letter, and the inevitability of tragedy sets in. Just so in the 
Oedipus Rex: Jocasta’s hopeless words of appeasement are hardly uttered when the 
Corinthian messenger arrives, with news that will induce the final catastrophe. ‘It is as 
though, by this coincidence, the gods were mocking Jocasta’s act of piety’.291 
 
If Oedipus is morally innocent, as Dodds and others think he is, why does he blind himself? 
This was by no means a fixed feature of the myth: for example, we know that in Euripides’ 
version Oedipus is blinded by Laius’ servants.292 Bernard Williams argues that Oedipus feels 
‘agent regret’ for actions that he performed unintentionally: he did not intend the parricide or 
the incest, but he decides to ‘own’ them nevertheless.293 Along similar lines, Hegel thought 
that Oedipus blinds himself because he identifies himself with his acts.
294
 The reason for the 
blinding that Dodds offers has to do with pollution: ‘Morally innocent though [Oedipus] is 
and knows himself to be, the objective horror of his actions remains with him and he feels 
that he no longer has any place in human society’ (1973, 72). Dodds cites as ‘the nearest 
parallel’ to Oedipus’ situation the story of Adrastus in Herodotus (I, 35–45), who ‘was the 
involuntary slayer of his own brother, and then of Atys, the son of his benefactor Croesus; the 
latter act, like the killing of Laius, fulfilled an oracle’ (ibid.). Although Croesus forgave 
Adrastus, on the basis that the killing of his son had been brought about by divine agency, 
Adrastus refused to demit responsibility, and committed suicide. In one respect Adrastus’ 
case is unlike Oedipus’; for Adrastus got over the fratricide, and it was the further killing—of 
someone who was genetically a stranger to him—that broke him. But in another respect the 
parallel is close, though the connection does not help the understanding of the Oedipus Rex 
according to which Oedipus is morally innocent. For in the case of Herodotus’ story we must 
ask, as we should always ask when confronted with instances of divine intervention: why did 
the god intervene? Why pick on Adrastus? Well, observe that Adrastus was the sort of man 
who would make just this mistake: suspicious—no? And does not half the blame lie with 
Croesus, who, terrified by the prophecy that his son Atys would be killed, employed to 
protect him a man who, he knew, had a record of accidental killing? So far from supporting 
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Oedipus’ moral innocence, the parallel implies the opposite. But Dodds’s explanation of the 
self-blinding is independent of this point and can stand. Oedipus’ innocence or guilt is 
irrelevant to the issue of pollution. As Dodds says, ‘Oedipus mutilates himself because he can 
face neither the living nor the dead’ (1973, 71).295 But Oedipus also blinds himself because, 
like Wilmot’s Tancred and Shakespeare’s Gloucester, he stumbled when he saw.296 Then he 
was a seeing blind man; now, like Teiresias, he is a blind seeing man.
297
 The act of self-
maiming brings to its natural conclusion a running theme of the play.
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